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ISSUE PRESENTED 
Pursuant to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' Order Certifying State Law Ques-
tions dated March 2, 2012, and this Court's Order of Acceptance dated March 13, 2012, 
the following question has been certified to this Court pursuant to UTAH R. APP. P. 41: 
Under Utah preclusion law, is the Utah Supreme Court's discretionary re-
view of a petition for extraordinary writ and subsequent dismissal on laches 
grounds a decision "on the merits" when it is accompanied by a written 
opinion, such that later adjudication of the same claim is barred? 
STATEMENT O F THE CASE 
Appellee adopts the statement of the case in the Tenth Circuit certification order, 
which is included as Addendum A to this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
When a federal court certifies a question of state law to this Court, both the Utah 
Constitution and this Court's rules limit this Court's jurisdiction to answering the ques-
tion of law presented. UTAH CONST., art. VIII, § 3; UTAH R. APP. P. 41; Burkholtz v. 
Joyce, 972 P.2d 1235, 1236 (Utah 1998). 
The general question of state law the Tenth Circuit has certified to this Court cen-
ters on the preclusive effect of denial of a petition for extraordinary writ under Utah law 
when the denial is accompanied by a written opinion. The specific question before the 
federal courts—the preclusive effect of this Court's decision in Fundamentalist Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, 238 P.3d 1054—will be 
answered by the Tenth Circuit, based upon law applicable in that system of courts, in-
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I 
formed as it may deem appropriate by this Court's answer to the certified question. It 
would be beyond the certified question, and beyond the limited constitutional grant of ju-
risdiction to this Court in answering the question, for this Court to opine specifically as to 
the preclusive effect of Lindberg. j 
The characteristics of extraordinary writ jurisdiction itself dictate that denial of a 
petition for extraordinary writ is not a decision on the underlying merits. Like with writs 
i 
of certiorari, the reviewing court has absolute discretion to grant or deny the writ, and 
may deny the writ even where the underlying decision from which relief is sought is de-
monstrably wrong. State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, \ 23, 127 P.3d 682 ("Unlike a party fil- < 
ing a direct appeal, a petitioner seeking rule 65B(d) extraordinary relief has no right to 
receive a remedy that corrects a lower court's mishandling of a particular case."). Stand-
i 
ing alone, therefore, the denial of the writ does not indicate any decision on the underly-
ing merits. 
The certified question asks whether the presence of a written decision changes this 
general rule. This concern appears to be based on an old constitutional provision, relied 
upon by Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 575 P.2d 705 (Utah 1978), requir-
ing Supreme Court decisions to be in writing. That provision is no longer in effect, how-
ever, and Appellee respectfully submits that the presence of a written opinion, standing 
i 
alone, is neither necessary nor sufficient to determine the preclusive effect of the deci-
sion. 
Instead, where the court gives a written explanation of the reasons for dismissing a , 
petition for extraordinary writ, the preclusive effect of the dismissal depends upon the 
-2-
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express terms of the writing as well as the nature of the case and the circumstances of the 
denial. The written opinion may itself state that the court did not reach the underlying 
merits. In the absence of such an expression of intent, the denial must be analyzed in 
terms of the underlying context. 
In considering the nature of the case and the circumstances of the denial in con-
text, several factors inform the analysis. First, the petitioner in extraordinary writ pro-
ceedings may or may not be a party to the underlying case. Indeed, non-party status in 
the underlying case is one of the acknowledged bases for determination that the petitioner 
has no other adequate remedy, making review by extraordinary writ appropriate. See So-
ciety of Prof. Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah 1987). 
This in turn bears on the second factor, which is the extent to which the laches de-
termination is based on actual litigation of the underlying facts. This Court is not a fact-
finding court. Thus, because laches is a factual determination, one must look elsewhere 
to see if a proper factual determination was made in a setting where there was adequate 
participation by all affected parties such that the requirements of due process and oppor-
tunity to litigate were satisfied. Where the petitioner is a non-party to the underlying 
case, any underlying factual claims must necessarily be immediately suspect. 
Third, because extraordinary writ review is entirely discretionary, the refusal of 
the petitioned court to accept the case does not by itself permit any conclusions to be 
drawn concerning the underlying merits. Thus, absent clear evidence of other factors 
suggesting that a merits review was possible and was actually completed, a refusal to ac-
cept the writ petition based on laches is only preclusive as to subsequent requests for ex-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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i 
traordinary relief. Gates v. Taylor, 2000 UT 33, ^ 2, 997 P.2d 903 (per curiam). This is 
consistent with general law holding that limitations and laches dismissals are generally 
not considered to be on the merits unless the express language or necessary, specific, 
properly developed factual findings dictate otherwise. Both Day v. Estate of Wiswall, 93 ^ 
Ariz. 400, 381 P.2d 217, 220 (1963); and Johnson v. City ofLoma Linda, 24 Cal.4th 61, 
99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 316, 5 P.3d 874 (2000), cited by the Tenth Circuit in the certification or-
\ 
der, apply this view. 
Finally, consistent with the discretionary nature of extraordinary writ review, one 
must carefully analyze the denial to ascertain whether a true and thorough laches analysis I 
was applied. This would include determination of applicable facts as described above, 
but also actual weighing and balancing of relative harms and prejudice to all participants 
in the litigation, as required by Utah law when a laches defense is asserted. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT HAS ALREADY DECIDED LINDBERG AND 
SHOULD NOT MODIFY OR COMMENT ON IT IN 
ANSWERING THE CERTIFIED QUESTION. 
A. Utah Law Confines This Court to Answering Abstract Ques-
tions of Law In the Certification Process 
This Court's statement in FLDS Church, "[t]he FLDS Association's Trust modifi-
cation claims are barred by the equitable doctrine of laches Accordingly, we decline 
to reach the merits of these claims and dismiss the FLDS Association's Petition for Ex-
traordinary Writ," has obviously generated considerable controversy in the federal litiga-
tion. While one might argue that Lindberg in a sense commented on the laches defense 
-4-
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in the context of the "trust modification claims," this Court nevertheless explicitly stated 
that it did not reach the merits of the claims. Appellants have argued that, despite their 
having asked the Court not to reach the merits of Appellee's underlying claims, and de-
spite the Court's having granted that request by expressly declining to reach those merits, 
the Court should be viewed as having reached them anyway. Judge Benson has conclud-
ed that those merits were not adjudicated. 
The certification process, however, does not permit revisitation of Lindberg, nor 
should the Court in answering the certified question attempt to further clarify the holding, 
basis, or preclusive effect of that prior decision. The certification process is limited to 
answering questions of state law. According to UTAH R. APP. P. 41, "[t]he Utah Supreme 
court may answer a question of Utah law certified to it " The specific requirements 
for an order of certification emphasize and reinforce that certified questions are restricted 
to questions of law. See id., Rule 41(c) (a certification order must state "the question of 
law to be answered," that this question "is a controlling issue of law in a proceeding 
pending before the certifying court," and that "no controlling Utah law" is apparent) (em-
At oral argument on Appellee's extraordinary writ petition in Lindberg, the following 
colloquy took place: 
[CHIEF JUSTICE] DURHAM: In that your argument is focusing 
on the merits of the reformation of the trust. I'm assuming the fiduciary 
does not take the position that this extraordinary writ should be decided on 
the merits. 
MR. SHIELDS: No. We believe the extraordinary writ should be 
dismissed. (App. 4136-37.) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 
phasis added). Confinement of the certification process to questions of law is jurisdic-
i 
tional. UTAH CONST., art. VIII, § 3 ("The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction 
. . . to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United States."); see Hold-
en v. NL Industries, Inc., 629 P.2d 428, 431-32 (Utah 1981) (Utah Supreme Court has ju-
 i 
risdiction to consider certified questions only to the extent authorized by the Utah Consti-
tution). 
d 
It would be a misuse of the certification process to ask this Court to decide the 
preclusive effect of one of its past decisions in a federal case. When preclusive effect is 
at issue, the "first court does not get to dictate to other courts the preclusion consequences ( 
of its own judgment." 18 C. A. Wright, et al, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4405, 
at 82 (2007) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER]; accord Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S.Ct. 
(( 
2368, 2375 (2011) ("Deciding whether and how prior litigation has preclusive effect is 
usually the bailiwick of the second court.") (emphasis in original). 
B. The Question of Law Accepted By This Court Does Not Per- * 
mit Modification or Explanation of Lindberg, 
The Tenth Circuit observed the jurisdictional limitations on the certification pro-
cess by rejecting Appellants' respective requests to certify to this Court whether Lindberg i{ 
precluded Appellee's federal action.2 Instead, the Circuit certified an abstract question of 
See Motion to Certify of Appellant Home, at 4-5 (arguing for certification of the ques-
tion of "the preclusive effect of the Lindberg judgment"); Motion to Certify of Appellants 
Wisan & Lindberg, at 2 (arguing for certification of "whether a prior decision of the Utah 
Supreme Court rejecting the attempt of Plaintiff-Appellee to raise the same constitutional 
claims at issue here on laches grounds should be given res judicata effect"). 
Appellant Shurtleff moved for certification of a properly abstract question of law, Motion 
to Certify of Appellant Shurtleff, at 3, but also improperly urged the Tenth Circuit to ask 
-6-
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Utah law—whether a laches dismissal of a petition for extraordinary writ precludes later 
adjudication of the underlying claims when accompanied by written opinion. This ques-
tion does not ask, nor should it permit, this Court to comment on the effect of the Lind-
berg decision or to clarify what this Court meant in Lindberg or, indeed, to discuss Lind-
berg at all. 
In short, this Court lacks jurisdiction to decide whether Lindberg precludes Appel-
lee's federal action, and it has not been asked to do so. It is for the Tenth Circuit to de-
termine the preclusive effect (if any) of Lindberg within the federal court system, in the 
same manner that the preclusive effect of any prior decision is determined—by reading 
and analyzing the opinion in light of relevant state law, including this Court's answer to 
the certified question. 
II. DISMISSAL OF AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT PETITION IS 
NOT A JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS HAVING PRECLUSIVE 
EFFECT. 
A. The General Rule. 
Denials of extraordinary writs do not preclude subsequent litigation of the under-
lying substantive claims. 18A WRIGHT & MILLER, § 4445, at 306-07. 
Where the extraordinary jurisdiction of a court is unsuccessfully invoked 
and the court does not expressly adjudicate the tendered merits issue, the 
general rule is that there is no preclusive effect and the petitioning party is 
free subsequently to pursue his claim in any appropriate forum. 
this Court to explain the preclusive effect of Lindberg. Ld., at 4-5 (suggesting that this 
Court be "given the opportunity to review the question or at the very least clarify any 
ambiguity in [its] Lindberg decision."); see also Opening Br. of Appellant Shurtleff, at 12 
("The legal question is whether Utah courts would give preclusive effect to Lindberg."). 
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FOCUSv. Allegheny Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 842 (3d Cir. 1996) (apply-
ing Pennsylvania law). Accord, United States v. Holland, 66 F.3d 339 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(unpublished opinion) (denial of mandamus relief had no preclusive effect on claims ar-
gued in petition because standards for obtaining such relief "are harder to meet than 
merely showing reversible error on direct appeal.") (applying federal law); Hiley v. Unit-
ed States, 807 F.2d 623, 625-26 (7th Cir. 1986) (same); United States v. Dean, 752 F.2d 
535, 541 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Denial of a writ commonly rests on severe limitations of juris-
diction and discretion that prevent the court from applying ordinary tests of reversible er-
ror. If a decision is confined by these limitations, it should not preclude examination of 
the merits in later proceedings. Preclusion is appropriate only if denial rested on the mer-
its of the questions presented rather than remedial limitations."). 
If the merits of claims underlying an extraordinary writ are considered at all (and 
they often are not), they are considered only in light of much more difficult and restric-
tive standards for granting relief than are applicable to normal consideration under a 
court's mandatory jurisdiction. The denial of an extraordinary writ, therefore, cannot 
have preclusive effect on the merits of the underlying claims in another forum invoking a 
court's mandatory jurisdiction, because those merits were not adjudicated in the writ pro-
ceeding under the more permissive standards applicable to discretionary jurisdiction. 
B. Adoption by Utah Case Law. 
To a significant extent, Utah law already reflects the general rule. For example, 
this Court has characterized petitions for extraordinary writ as comparable to petitions for 
certiorari. State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, f 24, 127 P.3d 682; Renn v. Board of Pardons, 
-8-
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904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 1995). A denial of a petition for certiorari is not a judgment on 
the merits of the underlying substantive claims. E.g., Maryland v. Baltimore Radio 
Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950) ("[DJenial of a petition for certiorari "carries with it no 
implication whatever regarding the Court's views on the merits of a case which it has de-
clined to review"); 16B WRIGHT & MILLER § 4004.1, at 34 (same). Therefore, because 
denial of certiorari review has no preclusive effect on later litigation of the underlying 
claims, neither should denial of extraordinary writ petitions have preclusive effect on 
such claims. 
This Court has held that the grant of extraordinary writ petitions is subject to the 
same limitations of jurisdiction and discretion that prohibit a finding of preclusive effect 
under the general rule. Unlike a court exercising mandatory jurisdiction, a Utah court 
considering a petition for extraordinary writ is never required to take jurisdiction, even 
when it is clear that the petitioner has suffered undoubted constitutional wrongs. Barrett, 
2005 UT 88, Tf 23 ("Unlike a party filing a direct appeal, a petitioner seeking rule 65B(d) 
extraordinary relief has no right to receive a remedy that corrects a lower court's mishan-
dling of a particular case."). Proof of such violations merely makes the petitioner "eligi-
ble" for discretionary relief. Id., % 24 (a petitioner for extraordinary writ who "is able to 
establish that a lower court abused its discretion" is "eligible for, but not entitled to, ex-
traordinary relief."). 
A Utah court considering a petition for extraordinary writ has discretion to decline 
jurisdiction and dismiss the writ even when the petitioner establishes that the lower court 
committed material errors of constitutional law. E.g., Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, If 24; Bar-
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I 
rett, 2005 UT 88, \ 24. Therefore, a Utah court exercising mandatory appellate jurisdic-
. . i 
tion is obligated to correct constitutional errors below, whereas a court exercising discre-
tionary jurisdiction has no such obligation. In other words, a Utah court has complete 
discretion to deny a petition for extraordinary relief, even when the petition decisively ^ 
demonstrates that another court has committed indisputable errors of fundamental law. 
Cf. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, \ 23 (observing that relief on a petition for extraordinary writ is 
I 
"more difficult to obtain" than relief on direct appeal). 
Because the ordinary standards of mandatory jurisdiction, appellate review, and 
reversible error prescribed by this Court's precedents do not apply to extraordinary writ « 
petitions, denial of those writs cannot (as a matter of logic) and should not (as a matter of 
fairness) preclude subsequent litigation of the underlying substantive issues. 
i 
Denial of a writ commonly rests on severe limitations of jurisdiction and 
discretion that prevent the court from applying ordinary tests of reversible 
error. If a decision is confined by these limitations, it should not preclude 
examination of the merits in later proceedings. Preclusion is appropriate 
only if denial rested on the merits of the questions presented rather than {< 
remedial limitations. 
18A WRIGHT & MILLER, § 4445, at 306-07 This would be true whether or not the denial 
is accompanied by a written opinion. j 
In sum, this Court has already implicitly adopted the general rule that dismissal or 
denial of extraordinary writ petitions has no preclusive effect. 
-10-
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III. THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF A LACHES DISMISSAL OF AN 
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT PETITION TURNS ON WHETHER A 
COURT FOUND THE NECESSARY FACTS AND APPLIED 
THE REQUIRED LEGAL ELEMENTS, NOT ON WHETHER 
THE DECISION WAS IN WRITING. 
A. Because This Court Is Not a Fact-Finding Court, Its Rejec-
tion of an Extraordinary Writ Petition Cannot Resolve the 
Underlying Merits Except In Unusual Circumstances. 
This Court is not a fact-finding court. See State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 771 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("It is not the function of the appellate court to try the facts or sub-
stitute for the trial court in the determination of factual issues.") (quoting United States v. 
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1521 (10th Cir. 1989)). Laches is a question of fact: 
To constitute laches, two elements must be established: (1) The lack of dil-
igence on the part of plaintiff; (2) An injury to defendant owing to such lack of dil-
igence. Although lapse of time is an essential part of laches, the length of time 
must depend on the circumstances of each case, for the propriety of refusing a 
claim is equally predicated upon the gravity of the prejudice suffered by defendant 
and the length of plaintiff s delay. 
Papanikolas Bros. Ents. v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Assoc, 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 
(Utah 1975), cited with approval in Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, ^ f 28 ("In determining wheth-
er to apply the doctrine of laches, we consider the relative harm caused by the petitioner's 
delay, the relative harm to the petitioner, and whether or not the respondent acted in good 
faith"). Accordingly, "[t]he existence of laches is one to be determined primarily by the 
trial court; and reviewing courts will not interfere with the exercise of the trial court's 
discretion in the matter, unless it appears that a manifest injustice has been done, or the 
decision cannot reasonably be found to be supported by the evidence." 535 P.2d at 1260 
(emphasis added). 
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Under Utah law, appellate courts have original jurisdiction over petitions for ex-
traordinary writs. Therefore, if another court has not created a proper evidentiary record, 
the factual issues raised by the laches defense must be litigated before the appellate court 
for a dismissal of the petition for laches to have preclusive effect. Otherwise, there is no 
factual basis for the laches defense, but merely assertion and conjecture. 
It follows from the foregoing authorities that the res judicata effect of a dismissal 
of an extraordinary writ petition based on laches depends not on whether the decision was 
in writing, but on the context in which the issue arises. If the facts underlying the laches 
defense were not litigated, then the binding effect of the determination cannot extend be-
yond preclusion of subsequent requests for extraordinary relief because the dismissal was 
not based on a factual inquiry. Cf. WRIGHT & MILLER, § 4445, at 305-06 ("Preclusion is 
proper [when a court denies a preliminary injunction] so long as the parties have had a 
full opportunity to advance all of the evidence and arguments that would be available at 
full-scale trial on the merits."). 
The only way claims can be adjudicated is by reaching the merits through a 
presentation of evidence. The decision of this Court not to exercise its discretion to grant 
a writ petition, therefore, cannot preclude relief where the preclusion would be based on 
facts which were never litigated in any forum. 
B. Utah Law No Longer Requires That Merits Decisions Be In 
Writing. 
The certification order appears to be related in part to a question concerning the 
continuing viability of the decision of this Court in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake 
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County, 575 P.2d 705, 708 (Utah 1978). In that case, the Court had, "in a minute entry, 
dismissed the petition [for extraordinary writ] without stating any reason." 575 P.2d at 
707. The Court held: 
The minute entry was not a decision on the merits. Had it been, Ar-
ticle VII, Section 25, Constitution of Utah, requires such a decision, and the 
reasons therefor be stated concisely in writing. . . . A judgment denying a 
writ of prohibition without written opinion is not res judicata unless the sole 
possible ground of the denial was that the court acted on the merits, or un-
less it affirmatively appears the denial was intended to be on the merits. 
Since neither exception applies, the matter was not res judicata. 
Id. at 707-08. 
The constitutional reference is to a provision that no longer exists. It was original-
ly contained in Article VIII, § 25 of the 1896 Constitution, as follows: 
When a judgment or decree is reversed, modified or affirmed by the Su-
preme Court, the reasons therefor shall be stated concisely in writing, 
signed by the judges concurring, filed in the office of the Clerk of the Su-
preme Court, and preserved with a record of the case. Any judge dissenting 
therefrom, may give the reasons of his dissent in writing over his signature. 
With this constitutional provision no longer extant, the primary reasoning of the 
Court, that without a writing the decision could not be on the merits without violating the 
constitution, is no longer good law. The remaining statement of the Court in Kennecott, 
that res judicata would only apply if a merits denial was the only possible grounds, or if 
it affirmatively appears that action on the merits was intended, is taken directly from an 
American Law Reports annotation discussion of the preclusive effect of a minute entry 
denial. 21 A.L.R. 3d 206, §§ 12, 18. 
The principle that a minute entry denial is presumptively not a decision on the 
merits, however, does not establish the converse proposition that a denial with a written 
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opinion is presumptively on the merits, especially in light of the fact that the constitution 
no longer requires merits decisions to be in writing. Instead, the questions asked in 
Kennecott must still be answered: does it affirmatively appear that the denial was intend-
ed to be on the merits, or is that the only possible conclusion given the grounds for deni- j 
al? The written opinion is only significant insofar as it offers clues for answering those 
questions. This is the answer to the limited question asked by the Tenth Circuit, and the 
I 
proper inquiry, then, is the same as it is in any case in which res judicata is asserted. 
This Court's ample precedents on claim preclusion should be applied in that court, not 
this Court, to ascertain the preclusive effect of Lindberg. I 
C. The Day and Johnson Cases Cited By the Tenth Circuit Both 
Adhere to the Rule That Preclusion Turns on the Nature of 
the Underlying Factual Inquiry. 
The Tenth Circuit's certification order specifically discusses two cases, Day v. Es-
tate ofWiswall, 93 Ariz. 400, 381 P.2d 217, 220 (1963); and Johnson v. City ofLoma 
Linda, 24 Cal.4th 61, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 316, 5 P.3d 874 (2000). Both cases were ordinary 
appeals from trial court decisions, not extraordinary writ petitioner. Johnson applied the 
majority view discussed above, that laches is a defense which does not reach the merits of 
s i 
the case for preclusion purposes even when a court has mandatory jurisdiction. 5 P.3d at 
884. 
In Day, the Arizona court held that a prior California dismissal based on laches 
was on the merits and thus res judicata for the Arizona action. The California dismissal, 
however, was not simply a discretionary refusal to reach the merits. Rather, following a 
frill trial on the merits of plaintiff s claim to the estate of a decedent who had died over 50 
-14-
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years earlier, the California court found: "The separate and community interests [which 
plaintiff seeks to reach] * * * have been so intermingled over the period of approximately 
56 years that it would now be inequitable to segregate and evaluate such interest separate-
ly, and for such delay plaintiff is guilty of laches insofar as she seeks relief.. . ." 381 
P.2d at 220. The Arizona court accordingly held: "The judgment in the California suit 
was not one of dismissal, but, after a full hearing and consideration of evidence and a 
finding of laches as a fact, was that the plaintiff take nothing by reason of the actions. It 
was therefore a judgment on the merits." Id. (emphasis added). 
Day is thus consistent with the general rule that laches dismissals lack preclusive 
effect unless they fully litigate the merits under normal standards of proof. In contrast, 
where a court did not take evidence and find facts in a fairly litigated adversarial proceed-
ing, as is usually the case in a petition for extraordinary writ, a laches dismissal cannot 
operate as a dismissal on the merits which binds a court in a different jurisdiction. 
D. There Can Be No Preclusive Effect When the Legal Elements 
of Laches Have Not Been Weighed and Balanced Against 
Each Other. 
Under Utah law, a finding of laches requires a court to balance the relative harm to 
the defendant from plaintiffs delay against the relative harm to plaintiff if his or her sub-
stantive claims are not adjudicated. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, f 28; Papanikolas Bros., 535 
P.2d at 1260. Because a Utah court considering a petition for extraordinary writ has un-
constrained discretion to dismiss the writ for any reason or for no reason, it may do so 
without engaging in the full laches balance. Failure to do so, however, would prevent the 
dismissal from precluding subsequent litigation of the underlying claims. 
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Whether the harm to the plaintiff from a court's refusal to adjudicate the merits of 
plaintiffs claims outweighs the harm to defendant from plaintiffs delay depends on a de-
termination of the nature and gravity of the violations of law alleged in those claims. 
That determination, in turn, requires express consideration of the merits of those claims < 
in the court's opinion dismissing for laches, so as to determine their seriousness and the 
degree of harm that plaintiff might suffer if the court does not adjudicate them. A court's 
failure to expressly discuss, assess, and weigh the merits of the underlying claims in its 
opinion is functionally equivalent to dismissing those claims without opinion. 
IV. SHOULD THIS COURT DECIDE TO DISCUSS THE i 
PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF LINDBERG, IT SHOULD FIND 
UNDER THE FOREGOING PRINCIPLES THAT LINDBERG 
WAS NOT A DECISION ON THE MERITS HAVING 
PRECLUSIVE EFFECT. 
Appellee argued at Point I above that this Court lacks the power to determine the 
preclusive effect of Lindberg in this certification proceeding. Recognizing that the Ap-
pellants nevertheless will likely ask this Court to decide the possible preclusive effect of {] 
Lindberg, Appellee offers the following application to Lindberg of the principles dis-
cussed in Points II and III above. 
First, writ petitions are not appeals, but rather original proceedings in the appellate 
court. As such, they may or may not come to the appellate court with a fully developed 
record upon which the court might rely for factual findings. As noted above, a finding of 
laches depends upon facts: The reasons for the delay, the surrounding circumstances, and 
the consequences of the delay to the various stakeholders in the litigation. The appellate 
court is not equipped to take evidence and may not find facts. A trial court can engage in 
- I f i -
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that inquiry, but in the present case it must be recalled that Appellee was denied standing 
to intervene in the underlying action in Third District Court; thus, no mechanism existed 
for the trial court to take such evidence in an adversarial proceeding and otherwise in a 
manner which would bind Appellee. 
The Lindberg decision did not involve an appeal, nor did it involve an evidentiary 
record. It was an original proceeding in which the FLDS Association, as a non-party to 
the underlying case, sought to invoke this Court's discretionary jurisdiction. No evidence 
was ever taken concerning the prejudicial impact of delay, or how such impact might be 
mitigated. 
Second, this Court did not balance all the required factors in Lindberg. Specifical-
ly, this Court did not identify, assess, discuss, or weigh Appellee's legal arguments. And 
finally, the legal claims underlying Appellee's extraordinary writ petition included a 
structural violation of the Establishment Clause which is not subject to balancing or 
waiver. 
Appellee respectfully submits that the federal court's analysis of the preclusive ef-
fect of this Court's Lindberg decision on the prior-filed federal court action correctly ap-
plied the relevant principles of preclusion and constitutional law. 
A. Traditional Res Judicata Analysis Leads to the Conclusion 
This Court's Dismissal of the Petition for Extraordinary Writ 
on the Basis of Laches Was Not a Judgment on the Merits. 
The doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion are related. Insofar as per-
tinent here, a requirement of both branches of res judicata is that the issue or claim 
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sought to be precluded was fully and fairly litigated on the merits to a final conclusion. 
This Court has described the requirements of the two doctrines as follows: 
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action only if the suit in which that 
cause of action is being asserted and the prior suit satisfy three require-
ments. First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Se-
cond, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the 
first suit or must be one that could and should have been raised in the first 
action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the 
merits. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). 
Under the rules of issue preclusion, the adjudication of an issue bars its 
relitigation in another action only if four requirements are met. First, the 
issue in both cases must be identical. Second, the judgment must be final 
with respect to that issue. Third, the issue must have been fully, fairly, and 
competently litigated in the first action. Fourth, the party who is precluded 
from litigating the issue must be either a party to the first action or a privy 
of a party. 
Id., at 250. 
The U.S. District Court reasoned that, if the doctrine of laches was applicable at 
all (a point that court did not concede because of the ongoing and structural nature of the 
constitutional violations), a decision on the merits of that issue would have balanced the 
third-party consequences of delay against the extraordinary and ongoing violation of 
structural constitutional limitations and constitutional rights created by administration of 
the reformed trust. (App. 51-52.) 
The federal court then spent several pages of its decision scrutinizing Lindberg for 
signs that this Court had thoroughly considered the "harm to the petitioner," which of 
course requires an analysis of the merits of the petitioner's substantive claims to ascertain 
the nature and "gravity of the prejudice suffered" by the petitioner, and found none: 
-18-
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In the FLDS case, however, aside from the Utah Supreme Court's bare 
statement that laches entails a consideration of "the relative harm to the pe-
titioner," the court undertakes no assessment of any kind whatsoever as to 
whether the plaintiffs' claims of serious constitutional violations had any 
merit at all. There is no attention given to whether the state district court's 
reformation of the Trust was in violation of the First Amendment or wheth-
er the day-to-day administration and management of the Trust property 
constituted the ongoing serious constitutional violations on which the plain-
tiffs' case was based. Attention was devoted solely to discussing the delay 
and the alleged prejudice caused by the delay. Under these circumstances, 
the "merits" of plaintiffs' case were not considered. The "relative harm to 
the petitioner" (the plaintiffs) was not even mentioned. As a result, the 
plaintiffs have not yet had a forum in which their claims of serious constitu-
tional violations have been entertained or addressed sufficiently to earn a 
finding that they were on the merits. (App. 61-62.) 
The federal court did not say or imply that this Court misapplied the doctrine of 
laches, but simply recognized the more restrictive jurisdictional and review standards that 
apply to extraordinary writ petitions under Rule 65B. In this Court's own words, "even 
if the FLDS Association shows that the district court abused its discretion, extraordinary 
'[r]elief under rule 65B(d)(2) is completely at the discretion of [this court].'" 2010 UT 
51, If 24 (editing by the Court). 
Judge Benson stated: 
My main reason or one of my main reasons for not finding res judicata ef-
fect is because they claim in this case that laches in Utah considered harm 
to the petitioner, the person bringing the claim, and they didn't address that 
more than they did, which was their entitlement, as I understand their law 
pertaining to the petition for an extraordinary writ, and was completely 
within their rights and jurisdiction as I see it, but that is not my job. I'm a 
totally different sovereign. I am a court in a totally different sovereign and 
situation. (App. 182.) 
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In other words, this Court was not required to thoroughly assess the merits in dis-
missing the writ petition for laches. Even if—as the fiduciary claimed in his arguments 
to the federal court—this Court had assumed the validity of the petitioners' merits argu-
ments, it could deny what was completely discretionary relief. On the FLDS Association 
members' motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, however, 
the federal court was required to thoroughly assess and weigh the merits in the laches 
balance. 
Unlike Lindberg, Judge Benson did not have discretion to dismiss the case before 
him, and so independently weighed those merits to decide whether laches was an appro-
priate defense to the federal claims. (App. 51-56.) After actually weighing the merits, 
the court found no basis for application of the doctrine of laches: 
To apply laches in this situation would be to place the violation 
of the First Amendment behind the fees and expenses of the very state ac-
tors, and those of the (mostly) former, and now disaffected, members of the 
FLDS church who have encouraged the state actors to take over the Trust. 
If the defendants are in territory where they are constitutionally not permit-
ted to be, the law should require their eviction, not sanction their continued 
presence just so they can be paid for the invasion. (App. 55-56.) 
The federal court's independent weighing of the merits was not precluded by this 
Court's decision in Lindberg, where Appellee's participation was barred below and 
where the merits were not weighed in this Court. Accordingly, the federal court's deter-
mination that the laches ruling did not have preclusive effect on the substantive federal 
4
 The court also held that "[T]he tort lawsuit settlements certainly can be dealt with by 
the same legal system that one would expect to be able to allow these plaintiffs to some-
where obtain a ruling on the merits of their constitutional claims." (Id., p. 55.) 
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constitutional claims was appropriate, legally correct, and within that court's jurisdiction 
to decide. 
B. Because Defendants' Actions Violate Structural Constraints 
Imposed by the Establishment Clause, Laches Is Not a Proper 
Defense to the Underlying Claims. 
Finally, the establishment clause violations of which the FLDS Association com-
plains are structural constitutional violations which, as will be demonstrated below, are 
not subject to equitable defenses such as waiver or laches. As limitations on government 
power, they are—like subject matter jurisdiction—able to be raised at any time. As 
Judge Benson noted: 
[0]n the current state of the record the case for laches is not made. This is 
especially true given this court's view, as expressed above, that the defend-
ants' actions were, and continue to be, in clear violation of the Establish-
ment Clause and most likely in violation of the Free Exercise rights of the 
plaintiffs. On the present state of the record, it would be inequitable in the 
extreme to dismiss this case in its entirety on the basis of laches and thereby 
allow these serious constitutional violations to multiply and get worse. 
(App. 55.) 
The passage of time, even with reliance, does not validate an otherwise prohibited gov-
ernmental exercise of power. 
1. The Constitution's Structural Limitations. 
"Structural" constitutional restraints arise from the constitution's division of pow-
er between the states and the federal government and its branches. See Philip Bobbitt, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 230 (1982); e.g., THE FEDERAL-
IST No. 9 (Hamilton), at 51 (Jacob E. Cook ed. 1961); id., No. 47 (Madison), at 323; id, 
No. 51 (Madison), at 351. Constitutional structure allocates sovereign power, granting it 
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to or withholding it from the states or the federal government. I Laurence Tribe, 
i 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2-3, at 125-26 (3d ed. 2000); e.g., Dennis v. Hig-
gins, 498 U.S. 439, 453 (1991) ("[T]he Commerce Clause is a structural provision allo-
cating authority between federal and state sovereignties.") (Kennedy, J., concurring). j 
Structural constitutional restraints function as absolute disabilities on government, 
denying it power to act at all in connection with to certain subject matters. Unlike person-
4 
al constitutional rights, which may be waived by their holders or set aside to protect com-
pelling government interests, structural restraints are not subject to waiver or interest-
balancing, because they delineate non-transgressable limits on government action. See, i 
e.g., City ofN.Y. v. Clinton, 524 U.S. 417, 452 (1998) (presentment and bi-cameral veto); 
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Commodity Futures Trading Commyn v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 
850-51 (1986) (Article III jurisdiction); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942 n.13, 951-59 
(1983) (presentment and bi-cameral enactment). As the Supreme Court suggested in a 
famous dictum, structural constitutional prohibitions "go to the very root of the power of 
Congress to act at all, irrespective of time or place." Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 
277 (1901); see also id. at 297-98 (concurring opinion) (describing Establishment Clause 
and other First Amendment norms as "absolute withdrawals of power which the Constitu-
tion has made in favor of human liberty" and which "are applicable to every condition or 
status.). Such structural constraints cannot be waived or balanced away. 
The violation of structural restraints may properly be raised at any time. Like a 
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, government action in the face of a constitutional deni-
al of power cannot be cured by the passage of time or even a compelling government in-
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terest. And if harm to a compelling government interests is not sufficient to justify viola-
tions of structural restraints, then a fortiori individual harm is insufficient as well. 
Laches, of course, is based on a balance of harms to the parties from the plaintiffs 
delay in bringing a legal claim. It follows, then, that laches is never an adequate defense 
to violations of the Constitution's structural restraints. 
2. The Establishment Clause as Structural Limitation. 
The Establishment Clause violations alleged by Appellee in Lindberg and in its 
federal action are structural. The Establishment Clause has long been characterized as an 
absolute structural limit on government action that is not subject to waiver or balancing. 
E.g., Borden v. School Dist, 523 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2008) (applying interest-balancing to 
speech and free exercise but not Establishment Clause claims); Colorado Christian Uni-
versity v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1266 (10th Cir. 2005) ("Establishment Clause viola-
tions . . . are usually flatly forbidden without reference to the strength of governmental 
purposes."); South Ridge Bapt. Ch. v. Industrial Comm'n, 911 F.2d 1203, 1206 (6th Cir. 
1990) (applying interest-balancing to free exercise but not Establishment Clause entan-
glement claim); Johnson v. Sanders, 319 F. Supp. 421, 433 n.32 (D. Conn. 1970) (private 
religious schools may not waive Establishment Clause entanglement claims to receive 
public funds); State v. Gaydos, 81 S.W.3d 186, 192 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (the Religion 
Clauses constitute "a limitation on civil court jurisdiction over disputes which are either 
essentially religious in nature or are sufficiently intertwined with church polity as to con-
stitute a threat of entanglement with religious doctrine or practice."). See generally, Carl 
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H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Constraint on Governmental Pow-
er, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 33-60 (1998). 
The Establishment Clause prohibits state governments from composing prayers, 
e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), or teaching religion in the public schools, e.g., 
McCollum v. Board ofEduc, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), or endorsing Christianity, e.g., ACLU 
v. City & Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), or interpreting or applying theology, 
Serbian E. Orth. Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) or engaging in innumera-
ble other actions relating to religious belief and practice, even if no one objects and re-
gardless of the strength of the government's reasons for doing so. 
In the present case, Appellants may not violate the Establishment Clause's struc-
tural limitations imposed on their administration of the UEP Trust, even assuming that 
they had good reason to do so and those affected by the conduct did not object. The ex-
istence and operation of the Trust are at the core of FLDS religious exercise and belief. 
The creation and administration of the Trust, moreover, are expressly rooted in the FLDS 
theology of consecration and stewardship. Accordingly, Appellants are absolutely pro-
hibited from transforming the Trust from religious to secular, from administering the 
Trust according to secular principles, or from interpreting and applying the "just wants 
and needs" of Trust beneficiaries as defined by the FLDS doctrine of consecration and 
stewardship, regardless of the justifications they offer or whether Appellee or anyone else 
objected at what Appellants deemed to be the appropriate time. 
In sum, Appellants' exercise of jurisdiction and control over the Trust constitutes a 
continuing nonwaivable and nonjustifiable violation of the absolute structural limits im-
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posed by the Establishment Clause. The laches determination in Lindberg, therefore, 
cannot be viewed as a decision on the merits, because on the merits the underlying struc-
tural claims were not subject to that defense. The only reasonable reading of Lindberg is 
that the defense of laches prevented Appellee from accessing relief by extraordinary writ, 
not that it precluded Appellee from asserting its structural violation claims in all other fo-
rums. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah has a well-developed and robust body of law for the Tenth Circuit to apply to 
the determination whether Lindberg has preclusive effect in the courts of Utah, which in 
turn is one part of the federal preclusion analysis. Accordingly, Appellee respectfully 
submits that the proper answer to the certified question is that the preclusive effect of 
dismissal of an extraordinary writ petition on laches grounds depends upon the express 
language used, the nature of the case, and the circumstances of the denial. The determi-
nation does not turn upon the presence of a written opinion. 
DATED this ffiOdav of April, 2012. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Rodney R^Parker 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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i 
ORDER CERTIFYING STATE LAW QUESTIONS 
( 
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, BALDOCK and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. 
( 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, pursuant to Tenth 
Circuit Rule 27.1 and Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 41, requests that the Utah ( 
Supreme Court exercise its discretion and accept the following important certified 
question of Utah law: 
Under Utah preclusion law, is the Utah Supreme Court's 
discretionary review of a petition for extraordinary writ and 
subsequent dismissal on laches grounds a decision "on the 
merits" when it is accompanied by a written opinion, such
 { 
that later adjudication of the same claim is barred? 
The resolution of this question of Utah law will likely control the outcome in 
appeals pending before our court. There does not appear to be any controlling Utah law j 
addressing this issue. The background relevant to a determination of the certified 
question is set forth below. 
8 
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I. 
This case concerns a Utah probate court's reformation of a religious charitable 
trust—the United Effort Plan Trust ("UEP Trust")—and its ongoing involvement in the 
administration of that trust. In October 2008, plaintiff-appellee Fundamentalist Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints1 ("FLDS Association") filed a complaint in the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 
The complaint named as defendants the attorneys general of Utah and Arizona, Utah 
District Judge Denise Posse Lindberg, and Bruce R. Wisan, the court-appointed special 
fiduciary. The complaint included six claims for relief, including: (1) a claim for 
declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging deprivation of the FLDS Association's 
rights under the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the United States 
Constitution; (2) a claim for declaratory relief under Art. 1, §§ 1 and 4 of the Utah 
Constitution; (3) a claim for violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.: (4) a claim that Utah Code Ann. § 
76-7-101, which prohibits plural marriage, is unconstitutional as applied under the United 
States Constitution and the Utah Constitution; (5) a claim that Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-7-
1001,-412(1), and -412(l)(c) are unconstitutional as applied; and (6) a claim for 
1
 The church itself is not a party to this case. Plaintiff-appellee refers to itself as 
"The Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, an Association of 
Individuals" ("FLDS Association"). According to the district court's assessment, the 
FLDS Association includes some 5,000 people. As an association of individual church 
members or adherents, the FLDS Association does not represent the church itself or the 
Corporation of the President (COP), a separate legal entity. 
9 
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injunctive relief against the defendants' "continuing administration" of the UEP Trust. 
{ 
The FLDS Association later moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary 
injunction against the probate court's ongoing administration of the UEP Trust. 
In October 2009, while the federal case was pending, the FLDS Association filed a i 
petition for extraordinary writ in the Utah Supreme Court. The petition challenged Judge 
Lindberg's reformation of the UEP Trust on substantially similar grounds as the federal 
I 
complaint. The Utah Supreme Court dismissed the petition in a written opinion. The 
court observed that because "parties who file petitions for extraordinary writ under Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 65B have no right to receive a remedy that corrects a lower 
court's mishandling of a particular case, . . . extraordinary relief under rule 65B(d)(2) is 
completely" discretionary. Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
i 
Lindberg. 238 P.3d 1054, 1061-62 (Utah 2010) (footnote and internal quotation marks 
omitted). Citing the equitable doctrine of laches, the court observed that the FLDS 
Association "was not diligent in challenging the [state] district court's modification of the 
UEP Trust, and that lack of diligence has resulted in prejudice to numerous parties." IcL 
at 1066. 
After the Utah Supreme Court issued its decision Lindbergh the federal district 
court took up the FLDS Association's pending motion for a preliminary injunction. The 
court recognized that the constitutional claims raised in Lindberg were similar to those 
raised in the federal complaint. The court ordered supplemental briefing on the res 
judicata effect of Lindberg. In its February 24, 2011, memorandum opinion and order 
10 
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granting the FLDS Association a preliminary injunction, the district court determined that 
"the Utah Supreme Court's finding of laches [in Lindberg] was not a judgment on the 
merits for res judicata purposes." Memorandum Opinion and Order at 37, Fundamentalist 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Wisan. No. 2:08-cv-00772-DB (D. Utah 
Feb. 24, 2011). The court acknowledged that both parties "agree that the law of the state 
of Utah on this point is not settled" because "there is no clear precedent from the Utah 
Supreme Court or any other Utah state court regarding whether laches always constitutes 
a 'judgment on the merits' for res judicata purposes." IcL at 35. Despite this uncertainty, 
the court attempted to discern the Utah Supreme Court's likely approach to the question. 
It explained that while there are various approaches, "one common element... is whether 
the underlying case in which laches was found included a fair examination of the 
circumstances and merits of the suit." Id. at 38. In analyzing the Lindberg opinion, the 
court concluded that the Utah Supreme Court did not undertake an "assessment of any 
kind whatsoever as to whether the [FLDS Association's] claims of serious constitutional 
violations had any merit at all." IcL at 41. "As a result," the court reasoned, "the 
plaintiffs have not yet had a forum in which their claims of serious constitutional 
violations have been entertained or addressed sufficiently to earn a finding that they were 
on the merits." Id After concluding that Lindberg should not have preclusive effect, the 
court went on to grant the FLDS Association's motion for preliminary injunction because 
"the method the [defendants] chose to utilize in dealing with the Trust" likely violated the 
Constitution and supported preliminary injunctive relief. IdL at 47. 
11 
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II. 
We state at the outset that "[certification by this court in no way implies an abuse 
of discretion by the district court in failing to certify, but only indicates our independent 
judgment on the question." Pino v. United States. 507 F.3d 1233, 1235 (10th Cir. 2007).
 ( 
We have previously said that we must "seek to give meaning and respect to the federal 
character of our judicial system, recognizing that the judicial policy of a state should be 
decided when possible by state, not federal, courts." IdL at 1236. Undertaking de novo 
review of the question, see Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Reinhart 402 R3d 982, 1001-02 (10th 
Cir. 2005), we conclude that the Utah Supreme Court is the proper venue for this novel i 
and unsettled question of Utah law. 
The unsettled nature of this issue of Utah preclusion law is apparent to all parties 
involved in these complicated cases. While some have assured us that there is "a 
reasonably clear and principled course" for us to follow, see Pino. 507 F.3d at 1236, we 
have no trouble concluding that the preclusive effect of the Utah Supreme Court's ' 
dismissal of a petition for extraordinary writ on laches grounds is far from certain under 
Utah law. It is clear that a court's denial of a petition for extraordinary writ without 
written opinion is generally not a decision "on the merits" for purposes of res judicata. 
See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County. 575 P.2d 705, 708 (Utah 1978). And a 
party is barred by res judicata from seeking a petition for extraordinary writ in the Utah 
Supreme Court after such writ is denied by the Utah Court of Appeals in a written order. 
See Gates v. Taylor, 997 P.2d 903, 903 (Utah 2000) (per curiam) ("[W]hen a court of 
12 
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competent jurisdiction has adjudicated directly upon a particular matter, the same point is 
not open to inquiry in a subsequent action for the same cause and between the same 
parties.") (quoting Cohn v. Isensee. 188 P. 278 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920)). But the Utah 
courts have never squarely decided whether a dismissal of a petition for extraordinary 
writ on laches grounds bars subsequent litigation of the same claim, or related claims, in a 
different court. 
Courts in other states have reached different conclusions on this issue. Compare 
Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, 5 P.3d 874, 884 (Cal. 2000) ("The defense of laches has 
nothing to do with the merits of the cause against which it is asserted. . . . The telling 
consideration must be that laches constitutes an affirmative defense which does not reach 
the merits of the cause . . . . " (citation omitted)); with Day v. Wiswall's Estate. 381 P.2d 
217, 220 (Ariz. 1963) ("Unlike the statute of limitations, the doctrine of laches is properly 
applied only after a consideration of the circumstances and merits of a suit. . . . The 
judgment in the [prior] suit was not one of dismissal, but, after a full hearing and 
consideration of evidence and a finding of laches as a fact, was that the plaintiff take 
nothing by reason of the actions. It was therefore a judgment on the merits." (citations 
omitted)). 
While a court's dismissal of a petition for extraordinary writ may amount to an 
adjudication "on the merits," a court may also deny relief on discretionary grounds or on 
the basis of "limitations inherent in the extraordinary nature of the writ." Hiley v. United 
States, 807 F.2d 623, 625-26 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Where, as here, the denial of the petition is 
13 
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based not on the merits of the dispute, but rather on the limitations inherent in the 
extraordinary naiture of the writ, such a denial does not preclude examination of the merits 
of the questions presented in the mandamus petition under the doctrine[] of res judicata . . 
. .") ; see also FOCUS v. Allegheny Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 842 (3d Cir. 
1996) ("Where the extraordinary jurisdiction of a court is unsuccessfully invoked and the 
court does not expressly adjudicate the tendered merits issue, the general rule is that there 
is no preclusive effect and the petitioning party is free subsequently to pursue his claim in 
any appropriate forum."); 18A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 
4445 (2d ed. 2002) ("Denial of a writ commonly rests on severe limitations of jurisdiction 
and discretion that prevent the court from applying ordinary tests of reversible error. If a 
decision is confined by these limitations, it should not preclude examination of the merits 
in later proceedings. Preclusion is appropriate only if denial rested on the merits of the 
questions presented rather than remedial limitations." (footnotes omitted)). If a party is 
barred by laches from obtaining discretionary and extraordinary relief, does it necessarily 
follow that laches would apply of the same force to a claim invoking a court's mandatory 
jurisdiction? Because the proper course in Utah is not well marked, we will defer to the 
Utah Supreme Court's determination of the preclusive effect of its own decisions. 
III. 
Accordingly, under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 41, we hereby certify this 
question of state law to the Utah Supreme Court. The Clerk of this court shall transmit a 
copy of this certification order to counsel for all parties. The Clerk shall also forward, 
14 
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under the Tenth Circuit's official seal, a copy of this certification order and the briefs 
filed in this court to the Utah Supreme Court. These appeals are ABATED pending 
resolution of the certified question. 
Entered for the Court 
Mary Beck Briscoe 
Chief Judge 
15 
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DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice: 
INTRODUCTION { 
11 This case concerns the United Effort Plan Trust ("UEP 
Trust" or "Trust")—a trust originally formed in 1942 by what 
petitioners characterize as a fundamentalist religious group that 
was the predecessor of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints. The Trust was modified in 1998 so that it 
qualified as a charitable trust under Utah law. In 2006, the 
Utah Third District Court issued an order that modified the Trust 
again. This order was not appealed or otherwise challenged for 
nearly three years. In a petition for extraordinary writ, an 
association of members of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus < 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the "FLDS Association")1 challenges 
the district court's modification and subsequent administration 
of this Trust as unconstitutional and in violation of Utah law. 
We hold that because the FLDS Association has delayed this 
challenge for nearly three years, and because during this time, 
many parties have engaged in numerous transactions in reliance on j 
the Trust's modification, the FLDS Association's trust 
modification claims are barred by the equitable doctrine of 
laches. We also hold that all of the FLDS Association's 
remaining claims regarding trust administration, except one, are 
also barred by laches because they involve the same delay and , 
prejudice as the modification claim. The claim that is not 
barred by laches is barred because it is not ripe for 
adjudication. 
BACKGROUND 
12 In. 1942, the spiritual leadership of a fundamentalist 
religious movement called the "Priesthood Work" formed the United 
Effort Plan Trust. The UEP Trust stated that its purpose was 
"charitable and philanthropic," but conditioned membership in the 
Trust upon "consecration" of real and mixed property to the 
Trust. For this fundamentalist group—predecessors of the 
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the 
"FLDS Church" or "Church")—consecration was an act of faith 
whereby members deeded their property to the UEP Trust to be 
managed by Church leaders. Church leaders, who were also 
1
 The FLDS Association currently petitioning is not the FLDS 
Church, nor the corporation of that church's president. Rather, 
the association describes itself as "The Fundamentalist Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, an association of 
individuals." 
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trustees, then used this property to minister to the needs of the 
members. 
513 In 1986, some Trust property residents sued the UEP 
trustees for breach of fiduciary duty. The district court 
rejected those claims, finding that since the UEP Trust was 
charitable rather than private, the plaintiffs lacked standing to 
sue. In 1998, we reversed the district court's holding that the 
Trust was charitable. 2 We first noted that charitable trusts 
differ from private trusts because " A i n a private trust[,] 
property is devoted to the use of specified persons who are 
designated as beneficiaries of the trust; whereas a charitable 
trust has as a beneficiary a definite class and indefinite 
beneficiaries within the definite class, and the purpose is 
beneficial to the community.'"3 We then found that the UEP Trust 
was not a charitable trust because it was intended, from its 
inception, to benefit specified persons, namely the Trust's 
founders. 4 
514 In response to our decision, Rulon Jeffs, the sole 
surviving founder and beneficiary of the 1942 Trust, acting for 
himself and also in his capacity as president and Corporation 
Sole of the FLDS Church, along with the other trustees, executed 
the "Amended and Restated Declaration of Trust of the United 
Effort Plan" (the "1998 Restatement"). It is not disputed that 
the 1998 Restatement of the 1942 UEP Trust qualifies as a 
charitable trust. It broadened the class of beneficiaries beyond 
the founders of the Trust to all of those who "consecrate their 
lives, time[], talents, and resources to the building and 
establishment of the Kingdom of God on Earth under the direction 
of the President of the [FLDS] church." The 1998 Restatement 
provided that "in the event of termination of this Trust, whether 
by the Board of Trustees or by reason of law, the assets of the 
Trust Estate at that time shall become the property of the 
Corporation of the President of the [FLDS Church]." 
15 In 2004, then-FLDS Church president, Warren Jeffs, the 
Trust, and the FLDS Church were sued in two separate tort 
actions: the first action alleged child sexual abuse, assault, 
and fraud primarily against Warren Jeffs; the second alleged 
2
 Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Utah 1998). 
3
 Id. at 1252 (emphasis added) (quoting Olivas v. Bd. of 
Nat'l Missions of Presbyterian Church, 405 P.2d 481, 485 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1965)). 
4
 Id. at 1252-53. 
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civil conspiracy, fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, and other 
torts against Warren Jeffs, the FLDS Church, and the Trust. 
Rodney Parker of the law firm of Snow, Christensen & Martineau ( 
served as attorney for the Trust and the FLDS Church in these 
actions until he withdrew because his clients insisted upon a 
course of conduct with which he fundamentally disagreed, and 
because his clients had discharged him. Warren Jeffs, as 
controlling trustee, did not appoint a substitute attorney to 
defend the Trust in the litigation, leaving the Trust vulnerable 
to default judgments against it. 
56 With this concern in mind, Mr. Parker filed motions in 
the district court asking the court to give notice to the Utah 
Attorney General ("Utah AG") and the Trust land residents before , 
entering a default judgment against the Trust. In response, the 
Utah AG petitioned the district court for (1) removal of the 
trustees for breach of fiduciary duty; (2) an order compelling 
Warren Jeffs and the other trustees to appear and file an 
inventory, final report, and accounting of the administration of 
the Trust; and (3) appointment of a special fiduciary to serve 
until new trustees were appointed. The Utah AG's petition was 
filed in May 2005. Personal service was made on those trustees 
who could be found. Trustees who could not be served personally 
were served via substitute service. Publications were made where 
Trust participants resided. 
57 In a June 2005 preliminary injunction, the district 
court suspended the trustees and appointed a special fiduciary 
for the Trust. The special fiduciary's powers and authority were 
outlined in various district court orders. The district court 
gave the special fiduciary authority to act on behalf of the 
Trust. The district court also ordered the suspended trustees to 
prepare an accounting, deliver records, and cooperate with the 
fiduciary, but the suspended trustees failed to comply with this 
order. The district court asked the special fiduciary to prepare 
a memorandum identifying issues the court needed to address 
before appointing new trustees. Ultimately, the special 
fiduciary expressed concern in a memorandum filed with the 
district court that the Trust needed to be reformed if new 
trustees were to be appointed. 
58 On December 13, 2005, the district court entered an 
order that concluded the Trust could be reformed so that the 
special fiduciary could administer the Trust to meet the "just 
wants and needs" of the beneficiaries according to neutral, 
nonreligious principles. The district court cited Utah Code 
section 75-7-413 as its authority to use the doctrine of cy pres 
to modify the Trust. Cy pres is a common-law doctrine, now 
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adopted by statute in Utah Code section 75-7-413, that courts may 
apply when a charitable purpose of a trust "becomes unlawful, 
impracticable, impossible to achieve, or wasteful."5 Rather than 
allowing the Trust to fail in these situations, under the common 
law, courts would apply the trust "'to other charitable objects 
lawful in their character, but corresponding, as near as may be 
to the original intention of the [settlor]. '"6 The Utah Code's 
similar language allows a court faced with a trust whose purpose 
has become "unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve, or 
wasteful . . . to modify or terminate the trust by directing that 
the trust property be applied or distributed . . . in a manner 
consistent with the settlor's charitable purposes."7 
59 The district court listed two reasons for using cy pres 
to reform the Trust. First, the court found that the trustees 
had breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudent trust 
administration. Second, it found several Trust provisions to be 
"fundamentally flawed and unworkable." 
510 The following three principles guided the district 
court's reformation of the Trust: First, the court would attempt 
to preserve the Trust's charitable intent. Second, the court 
would only give effect to the Trust's legitimate and legal 
purposes. Finally, the court would employ "neutral principles of 
law." 
Ill To meet its first goal of preserving the Trust's 
charitable intent, the district court had to first identify that 
intent. It characterized the 1998 Restatement as having at least 
two purposes: first, the Trust was to advance the religious 
doctrines and goals of the FLDS Church; and second, the Trust was 
to provide for the just wants and needs of the FLDS Church 
members. The FLDS Association characterizes each of these goals 
as religious because participation in the Trust was conditioned 
upon living according to Church principles, with the president of 
the FLDS Church being the ultimate arbiter of individual 
righteousness. 
5
 Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-413(1) (Supp. 2010); see also In re 
Gerber, 652 P.2d 937, 939-40 & n.4 (Utah 1982) (explaining the 
history of the common-law cy pres doctrine). 
6
 Gerber, 652 P.2d at 939 (quoting Late Corp. of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Dav Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 
1, 56 (1890)). 
7
 Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-413(1)(c). 
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512 Using the second of its principles—to give effect only 
to the Trust's legitimate and legal purposes—the district court 
held that it could reform the Trust by excising the purpose of 
advancing the religious doctrines and goals of the FLDS Church to 
the degree that any of these were illegal. As examples of 
illegal doctrines it could not sanction, the district court 
listed "polygamy, bigamy, [and] sexual activity between adults 
and minors." The court instead focused its reformation on 
preserving the Trust's goal of providing for the just wants and 
needs of Trust participants, which it held was a "lawful 
religious purpose[]." 
3113 Despite finding a "lawful religious purpose," the third 
of the district court's principles mandated that the court reform 
the Trust using "neutral principles." The court understood this 
to mean that it could not resolve property disputes on the basis 
of religious doctrine. The district court's memorandum decision 
states, 
[C]ourts are prohibited by the First 
Amendment from resolving "rights to the use 
and control of church property on the basis 
of a judicial determination that one group of 
claimants has adhered faithfully to the 
fundamental faiths, doctrines and practices 
of the church . . . while the other group of 
claimants has departed substantially 
therefrom." In short, courts must separate 
that which is primarily ecclesiastical from 
that which is primarily secular, and must 
defer to ecclesiastical authority for 
ecclesiastical determinations. 
But the district court felt that if FLDS ecclesiastical leaders 
were able to make ecclesiastical determinations about who 
participated in the Trust, many former or disaffected members of 
the FLDS Church who consecrated property to the Trust "could be 
excluded from consideration notwithstanding their prior 
consecrations to the Trust." The district court found this 
unacceptable. It resolved that the Trust needed to be modified 
so that the role of ecclesiastical leaders would be to provide 
"non-binding input" to future trustees. These trustees would 
then use a neutral set of criteria and their own "good judgment"-
-informed but not bound by FLDS ecclesiastical advice—to 
determine the "just wants and needs" of the beneficiaries. 
514 Ultimately, the district court concluded that 
implementation of these principles would require modifying each 
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section of the Trust. These modifications included the 
following: stating that Trust property would only be used in 
furtherance of "legitimate Trust purposes" as identified by the 
court; allowing FLDS leaders to offer their nonbinding input, but 
granting the Board of Trustees the ultimate authority to 
determine who would be allowed to live on Trust property and what 
the Trust property residents' just wants and needs were; limiting 
the Board's power to order relocation or property sharing among 
Trust property residents to situations where the relocation 
arrangement was "necessary for legitimate Trust administration 
reasons"; and deleting or modifying the Trust's requirement that 
occupants of Trust land live according to Church doctrine. The 
goal of the district court was unambiguous: "A clear division 
must exist between the authority of the Board to act with respect 
to the Trust, and the authority of the priesthood to act with 
respect to the [FLDS Church] Plan." 
515 The district court decided that the Trust's third 
section would also need to be modified to strip the FLDS Church 
president of several powers under the Trust. First, the district 
court would remove any requirement that the president of the FLDS 
Church approve any Board action. Since the 1998 Restatement gave 
the FLDS Church president power to appoint and remove trustees, 
the district court invited interested parties to suggest Trust 
modifications that would allow for a different method of 
appointing and removing trustees. Second, the district court 
modified the Trust to remove the president of the Church as 
trustee and as president of the Board of Trustees. The court 
felt this modification was necessary because it had just 
suspended Warren Jeffs, the FLDS president, as a trustee and 
because it wanted to keep the Church and the Church Plan separate 
from the Trust. Finally, the district court found that a 
reversionary clause that would cause the Trust to revert to the 
FLDS president in the event of termination needed to be altered 
because the court had just suspended the FLDS president's 
trusteeship for violation of his fiduciary duties to Trust 
beneficiaries, and because, in the event of reversion, the Trust 
assets might be used to further illegal FLDS practices. 
SI16 In its order, the district court invited suggestions 
for reformation of the 1998 Restatement. It also formed an 
advisory board to aid the special fiduciary in administration of 
the Trust until trustees could be appointed. It was understood 
that the court would consider the members of the advisory board 
as candidates to become trustees. There were no active FLDS 
members on the advisory board. On October 25, 2006, the court 
entered an order reforming the Trust (the "2006 Reformed Trust"). 
This order was not appealed. 
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117 The 2006 Reformed Trust contains over 175 paragraphs 
compared to seventeen in the 1998 Restatement. The FLDS < 
Association complains that those who had sued the UEP Trust took 
the "laboring oar" in drafting the 2006 Reformed Trust, and that 
their goal was to transform the FLDS culture and to liberate a 
people they felt belonged to a dangerous cult. The FLDS 
Association also complains that the religious mission and purpose 
of the Trust have been removed—that what was "fundamentally a 
religious institution guided by divine inspiration" is now its 
"wholly secular mirror image." The FLDS Association feels that 
the 2006 Reformation suppresses the FLDS Church's role "as the 
spiritual and economic center of life in the communit[y]." 
SI18 The district court has retained jurisdiction over the 
administration of the Trust. It has instituted a process that 
allows Trust participants to petition to have the houses they 
live in distributed to them. The district court has expressed in 
a hearing that FLDS Church members are free to deed their houses 
over to any religious leader of their choice following 
distribution. Over the four-and-a-half years of the special 
fiduciary's administration, he has filed numerous reports with 
the district court. Some of the challenges the special fiduciary 
has faced in administering the Trust include the fact that Trust 
property has not been subdivided and multiple residents often 
live on one tax parcel. These conditions have complicated 
liquidation and distribution of Trust property. For instance, 
because the Trust's real property consists of several large 
parcels of land often containing several residences, if one of a 
parcel's residents fails to pay taxes, the parcel's other 
residents could face tax liens even if they have paid their fair 
share. The special fiduciary also complains that the suspended 
trustees'" failure to cooperate with him has caused the fiduciary 
to expend significant time and effort to obtain information and 
records about the Trust and its property and that he has incurred 
significant costs and expense in discovering this information. 
He further asserts that the suspended trustees have actively 
interfered with his administration of the Trust. 
119 But the FLDS Association, in turn, alleges that the 
district court and special fiduciary have engaged in religiously 
discriminatory behavior. The FLDS Association alleges that the 
special fiduciary has made numerous offensive and religiously 
discriminatory remarks, including characterizing FLDS Church 
leaders' determination of "just wants and needs" pursuant to 
scripture and revelation as the "whim of leadership," and 
"discriminating on the basis of religion"; referring to himself 
as the "State-Ordained Bishop" or "SOB" as a way of mocking the 
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FLDS faith; and describing the process of Trust administration as 
a "sociological and psychological war" with the FLDS Association. 
The FLDS Association also alleges that, despite claims to the 
contrary and due to a fear of creating a "UEP II," the district 
court and the special fiduciary plan to implement a religious 
test to distribute Trust assets that would award outright deeds 
to non-FLDS Trust participants, but would impose a spendthrift 
trust on any Trust participant likely to donate Trust 
distributions to the FLDS Church. 
520 On October 20, 2009, the FLDS Association brought these 
allegations to this court in a petition for extraordinary writ, 
filed under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B. The petition asks 
this court to do the following: find that the district court's 
actions have violated FLDS Church members' First Amendment rights 
and their rights under Utah's constitution, declare that certain 
sections of Utah's Uniform Trust Code are unconstitutional as 
applied to the FLDS Association, enjoin the district court from 
taking further action in the underlying UEP Trust litigation, 
declare the district court's reformation of the Trust 
unconstitutional, terminate the reformed Trust, overturn the 
district court's authorization to sell certain Trust property 
deemed sacred by the FLDS Association, terminate the appointment 
of the special fiduciary, and provide any other appropriate 
relief. Willie Jessop, a representative of the FLDS Association 
and a member of the FLDS Church, filed an affidavit with this 
petition outlining FLDS religious beliefs and what are in his 
view intrusions by the district court and the special fiduciary 
into Mr. Jessop's practice of these beliefs. The FLDS 
Association has also filed a substantially similar lawsuit along 
with a substantially similar affidavit by Willie Jessop in 
federal district court. 
5121 The original interested individuals who sued the Trust 
in 2004 (the "Original Interested Individuals"), the Utah AG, the 
Arizona Attorney General (the "Arizona AG"), and the UEP Trust 
through the special fiduciary all filed oppositions to the FLDS 
Association's Petition for Extraordinary Writ. Among other 
things, they have alleged that the FLDS Association lacks 
standing, that it has other plain, speedy, and adequate remedies 
available, and that laches bar the FLDS Association's claims. 
5122 The FLDS Association then filed a rule 8A petition with 
this court for emergency relief. This petition centered around 
three separate actions taken by the district court and the 
special fiduciary. First, the district court had allowed the 
special fiduciary to begin seeking buyers for certain Trust 
property the FLDS Association claimed was sacred. Second, the 
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special fiduciary had sold some of the Trust's dairy cows subject 
to a right to repurchase that was set to expire. Third, the 
district court had entered an order that asked the Utah AG and < 
the special fiduciary to submit suggestions under seal regarding 
how the Trust could be administered in such a way that might 
avoid the kind of extensive litigation that continued to ensue. 
The FLDS Association's petition asked us to stop the sale of the 
Trust property they deemed sacred, extend the time for repurchase 
of the dairy cows, and reverse the district court's order that 
sealed the submissions by the Utah AG and the special fiduciary. 
The petition for emergency relief drew responses from the special 
fiduciary on behalf of the UEP Trust, Harker Dairy (the purchaser 
of the cows), the "Twin Cities" (Hilldale and Colorado City), and 
the Arizona AG. We denied the FLDS Association's Petition for i 
Emergency Relief.8 
SI23 We now address the FLDS Association's rule 65B Petition 
for Extraordinary Writ. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code section 78A-3-102(2) (Supp. 2010). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
^24 The FLDS Association bases its petition on rule 65B, 
which states that, so long as "no other plain, speedy and 
adequate remedy is available, . . . relief may be granted . . . 
where an inferior court . . . has exceeded its jurisdiction or 
8
 The FLDS Association's petitions and the responses thereto 
have spawned additional litigation. The Utah AG has moved to 
strike the response of the Twin Cities, which we granted to the 
degree that the Twin Cities brought new claims, and otherwise 
deferred. The Utah AG also moved to strike a supplement that 
added Lyle Jeffs and Willie Jessop as named petitioners in this 
action. We have deferred this motion. The FLDS Association has 
moved to strike exhibits and related arguments in the Utah AG's 
and special fiduciary's responses. We have deferred this motion. 
The Original Interested Individuals have moved to transmit the 
record of proceedings below. The FLDS Association has opposed 
this motion, and we have deferred it. Because of our resolution 
in this case, we find it unnecessary to rule on any of these 
deferred motions. Additionally, on August 19, 2010, the FLDS 
Association filed a Petition for Emergency Relief asking this 
court to enjoin the Third District Court from administering the 
UEP Trust until we render our decision in this case. The Utah 
AG, the Ari2:ona AG, and the UEP Trust through the Special 
Fiduciary opposed this petition. The issuance of this opinion 
renders ruling on that petition unnecessary. 
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abused its discretion."9 Specifically, the FLDS Association 
alleges that the district court "committed an unprecedented abuse 
of discretion" when it reformed the UEP Trust. But parties who 
file petitions for extraordinary writ under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 65B have "xno right to receive a remedy that corrects a 
lower court's mishandling of a particular case/"10 So even if 
the FLDS Association shows that the district court abused its 
discretion, extraordinary "[rjelief under rule 65B(d)(2) is 
completely at the discretion of [this court]."11 Several factors 
inform our discretion to grant extraordinary relief, including 
the " 'egregiousness of the alleged error, the significance of the 
legal issue presented by the petition, the severity of the 
consequences occasioned by the alleged error,' and any additional 
factors that may be regarded as important to the case's 
outcome."12 While "there is no fixed limitation period governing 
the time for filing [extraordinary writs]," they "should be filed 
within a reasonable time after the act complained of has been 
done or refused," and "the equitable doctrine of laches is 
available to dismiss untimely writs."13 
ANALYSIS 
SI25 The FLDS Association's claims fall into two broad 
categories: first, that the district court's modification of the 
UEP Trust violated Utah law and the FLDS Association's members' 
constitutional rights; and second, that during the district 
court's ongoing administration of the Trust, the district court 
and the special fiduciary have engaged in conduct that also 
violates the FLDS Association's members' constitutional rights. 
In Part I, we hold that the FLDS Association's claims regarding 
the district court's modification of the Trust are barred by the 
equitable doctrine of laches. In Part II, we hold that all of 
the FLDS Association's remaining claims regarding the Trust's 
administration, except one, are also barred by laches. The claim 
that is not barred by laches is not ripe for our consideration. 
9
 Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a), (d)(2) (emphasis added). 
10
 State v. Lavcock, 2009 UT 53, 1 7, 214 P.3d 104 (quoting 
State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, 1 23, 127 P.3d 682). 
11
 Id^ . 5 8. 
12
 IcL 1 9 (quoting Barrett, 2005 UT 88, 1 24). 
13
 Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 684 
(Utah 1995). 
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I. THE FLDS ASSOCIATION'S CLAIMS REGARDING TRUST MODIFICATION 
ARE BARRED BY LACHES BECAUSE OF THE FLDS ASSOCIATION'S DELAY IN 
FILING THE CLAIMS AND THE PREJUDICE THAT HAS RESULTED ( 
SI26 Because the FLDS Association has waited nearly three 
years from the date the district court modified the UEP Trust to 
challenge its modification and, in the interim, transactions have 
occurred and other parties have acted in reliance on the Trust's 
modification, the FLDS Association's claims are barred by the 
equitable doctrine of laches. The FLDS Association asserts that 
the district court modified the Trust in violation of Utah law 
and the federal and state constitutions, and that the continued 
administration of the Trust violates their constitutional rights. 
Despite the potential merit of these claims, the district court's i 
order was never appealed, and the FLDS Association has waited 
nearly three years from the date of the Trust's modification to 
bring its case to this court. During this time, countless 
transactions have taken place in reliance on the Trust's 
modification. Accordingly, we dismiss these claims pursuant to 
the doctrine of laches. 
121 There is no statute of limitations for bringing a rule 
65B claim, but such claims "should be filed within a reasonable 
time after the act complained of has been done or refused."14 
And although laches is most often thought of as an affirmative 
defense to untimely claims brought by a plaintiff, we have held 
that "the equitable doctrine of laches is available to dismiss 
untimely writs."15 We have called laches "Melay that works a 
disadvantage to another.'"16 So, laches has two elements: (1) a 
party's lack of diligence and (2) an injury resulting from that 
lack of diligence.17 
TL28 The length of time that constitutes a lack of diligence 
"depend[s] on the circumstances of each case," because "the 
propriety of refusing a claim is equally predicated upon the 
gravity of the prejudice suffered . . . and the length of [the] 
14





 Anqelos v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 
1983) (quoting Papanikolas Bros. Enters, v. Suqarhouse Shopping 
Ctr. Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975)). 
17
 Id. 
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delay.//18 In determining whether to apply the doctrine of 
laches, we consider the relative harm caused by the petitioner's 
delay, the relative harm to the petitioner, and whether or not 
the respondent acted in good faith.19 Further, "reasonable delay 
caused by an effort to settle a dispute does not invoke the 
doctrine of laches."20 
SI29 In our 1975 case, Papanikolas Bros. Enterprises v. 
Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, we thoroughly explored the 
way Utah courts apply the doctrine of laches. There we held that 
a district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the 
plaintiffs' claims were not barred by laches.21 In that case, 
the defendants built a structure that encroached on a parking 
easement owned by the plaintiffs.22 When the plaintiffs noticed 
the defendants building the structure, they promptly contacted 
the defendants to object.23 The parties' lawyers exchanged 
letters, and significantly, over the next few months, the 
defendants attempted to negotiate a purchase of the plaintiffs' 
interest.24 Eighteen months after first noticing the building of 
the structure, the plaintiffs sued to enforce the restrictive 
covenant that created the easement.25 The defendants urged 
laches as a bar to enforcement.26 We held that there was "not 
the same imminent necessity for early enforcement of demands" as 
might have existed before the conditions became fixed because the 
defendants had "openly defie[d] [the plaintiffs'] known rights," 
without any indication of "assent or abandonment of intent to 
oppose on the part of [the plaintiffs]," and because the 
18



















at 1258, 1260. 
at 1260. 
535 P.2d at 1260. 
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( 
plaintiffs' delay caused "no substantial harm" to the 
defendants .27 
( 
SI30 The facts of the case now before us could not be more 
starkly different. The district court finalized its modification 
of the UEP Trust in October 2006 after nearly a year of 
discussion and an invitation to interested parties to make 
suggestions for modification.28 The order reforming the Trust 
was never appealed. The FLDS Association filed this petition { 
over four years after the Utah AG had intervened, over four years 
after the special fiduciary had been appointed, and nearly three 
years after the district court had modified the Trust. This 
amounts to at least twice the length of time that the plaintiffs 
in Papanikolas Bros, waited. The FLDS Association's brief does < 
not explain why the Association waited so long to challenge the 
Trust's reformation. But the FLDS Association's numerous 
complaints about the special fiduciary's administration of the 
Trust make clear it was not because the Association was unaware 
of the modification. Although the opposition briefs cite the 
FLDS Association's delay as a reason for this court to dismiss 
the petition, the FLDS Association does not respond with 
explanations as to why this delay is reasonable. Where in 
Papanikolas Bros, it was clear that the plaintiffs' negotiations 
with the defendants might have given them reason to delay 
litigation, here there were no discussions held with the district 
court until November 2008—nearly two years after the Trust had 
been modified and over three years after the litigation began— 
despite assurances by the court that participation was welcome. 
This delayed first contact with the district court spawned 
negotiations between the interested parties, who agreed to stay 
litigation in an effort to avoid the sale of certain Trust 
property. But these negotiations do not make the case for 
applying the doctrine of laches any less compelling. Unlike the 
prompt negotiations in Papanikolas Bros., these discussions came 
nearly two years after the act now complained of by the FLDS 
Association-—the district court's reformation of the Trust. 
Negotiations entered into nearly two years after events that 
formed the basis of a complaint do not excuse a nearly three-year 
delay in petitioning this court for extraordinary relief. 
27
 Id. at 1260-61 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
28
 The district court's memorandum decision stated, "In 
accord with the order and timetable discussed at the November 7th 
hearing, all. parties in interest are invited to provide the Court 
with their specific suggestions for reforming the Trust within 
the framework and principles provided by this Memorandum 
Decision." 
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3131 Additionally, the FLDS Association's silence during the 
Trust reformation process and the Trust's subsequent 
administration gave the district court every reason to believe 
that the reformation had occurred without opposition. Indeed, 
while the FLDS Association disagrees with the district court's 
application of the law, the court's motive appears to be 
protection of the beneficiaries' charitable interests, not 
defiance of FLDS Association members' rights under the Trust. 
532 Because of the three-year delay in the face of 
invitations by the district court to participate, and because 
this delay did not occur under circumstances that might excuse 
it, such as prompt negotiations aimed at avoiding litigation, or 
under circumstances that might make us otherwise hesitant to 
apply the doctrine of laches, the FLDS Association has 
demonstrated a lack of diligence in filing this petition. 
533 This lack of diligence has caused injury to those who 
relied on the Trust's modification during the FLDS Association's 
delay. The Utah AG aptly describes how the FLDS Association's 
delay has worked to the disadvantage of others: 
In the meantime, the Special Fiduciary 
reasonably relied on the presumptively valid 
appointment and reformation orders. He has 
made choices over the years, many expressly 
approved by Judge Lindberg, that cannot be 
undone. He has incurred irrevocable 
obligations and expenses for the Trust during 
the last four years. Other interested 
persons, including Trust Participants who are 
not members of the Petitioner association, 
have also made irreversible decisions and 
changed their positions based on these 
unappealed and heretofore unchallenged final 
orders. 
534 Further, the Original Interested Individuals, whose 
looming default judgments led to the district court's reformation 
of the Trust, have expressed that their settlements with the 
Trust were predicated upon the Trust's reformation. That is, 
"[h]ad it not been for the UEP Trust's reformation, the Original 
Interested Individuals would never have settled their lawsuits 
against the Trust." The FLDS Association's delay in filing this 
petition has injured the Original Interested Individuals because 
it has caused the Individuals to change positions on their own 
claims, and any relief we granted the FLDS Association would 
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I 
operate against the interests of the Original Interested 
Individuals. 
I 
SI35 In sum, many individuals have relied upon the district 
court's final order from over three years ago, and the FLDS 
Association has given no adequate explanation for its delay in 
appealing or otherwise petitioning for relief. The FLDS 
Association has shown a lack of diligence in challenging the 
modification of the Trust, and this lack of diligence has ' 
operated to the detriment of others. The FLDS Association offers 
no adequate explanation for its delay and no other circumstances 
exist that might make us otherwise hesitant to apply laches. 
Accordingly, we dismiss the FLDS Association's Trust modification 
claims pursuant to the doctrine of laches. 
II. THE FLDS ASSOCIATION'S TRUST ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS ARE ALSO 
BARRED BY LACHES, EXCEPT ONE THAT IS NOT RIPE FOR OUR 
CONSIDERATION 
536 The FLDS Association's remaining claims, many of which 
merely recharacterize its first claim, either suffer from the 
same lack of diligence as its Trust modification claims and are 
also barred by laches, except one claim that is barred because 
it is not ripe for our consideration. The FLDS Association 
claims that the continuing administration of the Trust violates 
its members' constitutional rights. The FLDS Association cites 
Colorado Christian University v. Weaver—a case that held 
unconstitutional publicly funded scholarships for students 
attending public, private, and sectarian, but not pervasively 
sectarian universities29--for the propositions that the 
Establishment Clause forbids discrimination within and among 
religions, intrusive inquiry into religious matters, and forcing 
people to choose between their religious beliefs and government 
benefits. The FLDS Association complains of five actions taken 
by the district court—characterized as pertaining to the 
administration of the Trust—that the Association feels are 
constitutionally infirm. 
SI37 But the first four of these actions either occurred 
before or as part of the district court's modification of the 
Trust and, just as the modification claims discussed in Part I, 
could have been and should have been brought three years ago. 
For instance, the FLDS Association first claims that the district 
court did not properly consider the special fiduciary's 
background and qualifications before selecting him. But the 
special fiduciary was selected before the Trust was modified. 
29
 534 F.3d 1245, 1250, 1269 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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The FLDS Association next claims that the court improperly 
allowed FLDS detractors to take the "laboring oar" in drafting 
the reformed Trust. But this claim is really a 
recharacterization of the claim discussed in Part I, because it 
goes to the Trust's modification and not its subsequent 
administration. The FLDS Association's third claim—that the 
Special Fiduciary and the individuals who sued the Trust openly 
shared with the court that their purpose in reforming the Trust 
was to transform FLDS culture and liberate the FLDS people—also 
goes to the modification of the Trust rather than its 
administration. The fourth claim complains that the advisory 
board that the district court selected consisted of enemies of 
the FLDS Church. But the advisory board was created by the 
district court's December 2005 order, issued ten months before 
the Trust was modified. 
ST38 To the degree that any of these claims actually go to 
Trust administration and are not merely recharacterizations of 
the modification claims, any claims arising out of events that 
occurred during or before Trust modification suffer from the same 
defects as the FLDS Association's first claims: a lack of 
diligence and prejudice resulting from that lack of diligence. 
Here again, the FLDS Association could have brought these claims 
at least three years earlier. In the interim, parties have 
changed their positions, Trust participants have made 
irreversible decisions, and the special fiduciary has entered 
into irrevocable transactions and obligations. For the same 
reasons as discussed in Part I, these claims are barred by the 
equitable doctrine of laches. 
539 Only the FLDS Association's fifth claim arises from 
facts that occurred after the Trust was modified. Here the FLDS 
Association alleges that the district court endorsed a religious 
test that would give former FLDS members outright deeds to Trust 
property but would relegate current and practicing FLDS members 
to receiving spendthrift trusts based on the concern that they 
might deed their property back to FLDS Church leaders. It 
alleges that taking FLDS members' religion into consideration 
when determining eligibility for transfers of property from the 
Trust violates the members' First Amendment rights by forcing 
them to choose between their religion and a government benefit. 
140 But even on its face, the FLDS Association's last claim 
is not ripe. The ripeness doctrine "serves to prevent courts 
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( 
from issuing advisory opinions" on issues that are not ripe for 
adjudication.30 
( 
A dispute is ripe when a conflict over the 
application of a legal provision has 
sharpened into an actual or imminent clash of 
legal rights and obligations between the 
parties thereto. An issue is not ripe for 
appeal if there exists no more than a ( 
difference of opinion regarding the 
hypothetical application of a provision to a 
situation in which the parties might, at some 
future time, find themselves.31 
An issue is not ripe, for instance, in a situation where even if 
we agree with the petitioner's legal analysis of an issue, such 
an analysis would have no application to the facts the petitioner 
alleges.32 Even if we were to agree with the FLDS Association's 
assertion that district court relegation of FLDS Church members 
to receiving spendthrift trusts on the basis of their religion 
would violate the state and federal constitutions, that analysis 
would not apply to the facts the FLDS Association has alleged. 
541 The FLDS Association does not allege that either the 
district court or special fiduciary has actually used religion as 
a factor in determining how to parse out property. It does not 
cite any instance where an active FLDS member received a lesser 
delegation of property because of his or her religious beliefs. 
So, the FLDS Association does not assert an "actual" clash of 
legal rights. And given the district court's and the special 
fiduciary's assertions both in district court hearings and at 
oral argument in this case that a religious test would not be 
imposed—a position the FLDS Association acknowledges the special 
30
 State v. Ortiz, 1999 UT 84, 1 2, 987 P.2d 39; see also 
Clegg v. Wasatch Cntv., 2010 UT 5, f 26, 227 P.3d 1243. 
31
 Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52, 5 29, 215 P.3d 
933 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Utah Safe to Learn-Safe to Worship Coal., Inc. v. State, 2004 UT 
32, 1 20, 94 P.3d 217 ("[A]n issue is not ripe for review where 
there is no actual or imminent clash between the parties." 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
32
 See. Bd. of Trs. v. Keystone Conversions, LLC, 2004 UT 84, 
f 32, 103 P„3d 686 (declining to reach the merits of the 
appellant's argument because the appellant's claim of harm was 
purely hypothetical and not yet realized). 
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fiduciary has taken--such a clash does not seem "imminent," but 
rather merely "hypothetical." At most, the discussions the FLDS 
Association cites evince a concern shared by the district court 
and the special fiduciary that, without careful planning, Trust 
distributions could lead to the creation of a new trust 
containing many of the same attributes that have, on more than 
one occasion, landed the UEP Trust in Utah courts. But this does 
not mean that the district court "actually" has or "imminently" 
will use religion to discriminate against FLDS members, so this 
last claim is not ripe for our review. 
SI42 Because most of the FLDS Association's Trust 
administration claims suffer from the same lack of diligence and 
resultant prejudice as its modification claims, those claims are 
also barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. The FLDS 
Association's claim that the district court might use religion as 
a basis for determining property distributions is not ripe 
because the FLDS Association does not allege that such 
discriminatory distributions have actually occurred or are 
imminent. 
CONCLUSION 
543 The FLDS Association was not diligent in challenging 
the district court's modification of the UEP Trust, and that lack 
of diligence has resulted in prejudice to numerous parties. 
Therefore, the FLDS Association's Trust modification claims are 
barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. The FLDS 
Association's remaining Trust administration claims suffer from 
the same lack of diligence and resultant prejudice and are 
similarly barred by laches, except for one claim that is barred 
because it is unripe for adjudication. Accordingly, we decline 
to reach the merits of these claims and dismiss the FLDS 
Association's Petition for Extraordinary Writ. 
5144 Chief Justice Durham, Justice Parrish, Justice Nehring, 
and Judge Thorne concur in Associate Chief Justice Durrant's 
opinion. 
5145 Court of Appeals Judge William A. Thorne sat. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
THE FUNDAMENTALIST CHURCH OF 
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY 
SAINTS, an Association of Individuals, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BRUCE R. WISAN, Special Fiduciary of the 
United Effort Plan Trust; MARK 
SHURTLEFF, Attorney General for the State 
of Utah; THOMAS C. HORNE, Attorney 
General for the State of Arizona; and 
DENISE POSSE LINDBERG, Judge of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 
ORDER 
Case No. 2:08-cv-772 
Judge Dee Benson 
Before the court is the plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction. The issue presented by the motion and the case itself is straightforward: 
Are the defendants' actions in reforming and administering the United Effort Plan Trust ("UEP 
Trust" or the "Trust") in violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution? 
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The plaintiffs are approximately 5,000 members of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints ("FLDS"). The FLDS church has its origins in the teachings of
 { 
Joseph Smith, Jr. who, after publishing The Book of Mormon in 1829, organized the Church of 
Christ with 6 original members in upstate New York in 1830. The Church of Christ later became 
known as The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, often identified as the Mormon 
church. The church left New York shortly after its founding, and after failed efforts at 
settlements in Kirtland, Ohio, Jackson County, Missouri, and Nauvoo, Illinois, eventually 
I 
established itself in Salt Lake City, Utah Territory, in 1847. 
Among the Mormon church's earliest tenets was a belief in the commingling of assets. 
This practice is described in a book of revelations received by Joseph Smith called The Doctrine < 
and Covenants, which the Mormons regard as holy scripture. Section 42, verses 30-34 of The 
Doctrine and Covenants read as follows: 
I 
30 And behold, thou wilt remember the poor, and consecrate of thy properties for 
their support that which thou has to impart unto them, with a covenant and a deed 
which cannot be broken. 
31 And inasmuch as ye impart of your substance unto the poor, ye will do it unto 
me; and they shall be laid before the bishop of my church and his counselors, two of ^ 
the elders, or high priests, such as he shall appoint or has appointed and set apart for 
that purpose. 
32 And it shall come to pass, that after they are laid before the bishop of my 
church, and after that he has received these testimonies concerning the consecration 
of the properties of my church, that they cannot be taken from the church, agreeable . 
to my commandments, every man shall be made accountable unto me, a steward over 
his own property, or that which he has received by consecration, as much as is 
sufficient for himself and family. 
33 And again, if there shall be properties in the hands of the church, or any 
individuals of it, more than is necessary for their support after this first consecration, 
which is a residue to be consecrated unto the bishop, it shall be kept to administer to 
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those who have not, from time to time, that every man who has need may be amply 
supplied and receive according to his wants. 
34 Therefore, the residue shall be kept in my storehouse, to administer to the poor 
and the needy, as shall be appointed by the high council of the church, and the bishop 
and his council; 
This practice of community property sharing was generally referred to as the United 
Order or the Law of Consecration and was attempted with various amounts of sporadic success 
by the early Mormons in Ohio, Missouri, Illinois, and Utah. The southern Utah city of 
Orderville was originally settled by Mormon pioneers for the purpose of practicing strict 
adherence to the United Order. Orderville (population 608) is still a functioning city but any 
efforts to practice the United Order there were abandoned long ago. 
One of the other 19th century characteristics of the Mormon church was the practice of 
polygamy. Much has been written about this aspect of early Mormonism and how it influenced 
the political and social aspects of the growth and development of the Territory of Utah in the 
second half of the 19th century. See Shayna M. Sigman, Everything Lawyers Know About 
Polygamy is Wrong, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101 (2006); Rex Sears, Punishing the Saints 
for their "Peculiar Institution": Congress on the Constitutional Dilemmas, 2001 UTAHL. REV. 
581 (2001). Polygamy was, and remains, against federal law. Eventually, the Mormon church 
eliminated polygamy from its practices and in 1890 officially declared that its members were to 
no longer engage in polygamous relationships. Utah was thereafter granted statehood in 1896. 
Polygamy has been against the law in Utah ever since. The abandonment of the practice of 
polygamy by the mainstream Mormon church did not rest well with all people, leading some to 
continue the practice of polygamy, even though it was in violation of both federal and state law, 
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and in some instances to form splinter groups of like-minded practitioners. The FLDS church is 
one of these. 
According to the plaintiffs, they and their church have always believed in and attempted
 { 
to practice the United Order or the Law of Consecration, as outlined in The Doctrine and 
Covenants. The fundamentalist movement that led to the creation of the FLDS church was 
formerly known as the "Priesthood Work." Its leaders (called the "Priesthood Council") formed 
a trust in 1942 in order to live the United Order. The trust was called the United Effort Plan and 
declared that its "purpose and object.. . shall first be charitable and philanthropic" and its 
operations were to be "governed by the true spirit of brotherhood." Declaration of Trust, dated 
November 9,1942, at 4. Membership in the 1942 trust was based on "the consecration of such 
property, real, personal or mixed, to the trust in such amounts as shall be deemed sufficient by < 
the Board of Trustees." Id. at 7. 
In the early 1990s, the trustees of the 1942 trust were sued by a group of trust residents 
i 
who alleged breach of fiduciary duties and other claims. The state district court found the trust 
to be charitable in nature, which ruling was reversed by the Utah Supreme Court on Sept. 1, 
1998. The Utah Supreme Court held that the 1942 trust was not "charitable" because it < 
"benefitted specific individuals" and because "beneficiaries must consecrate property to benefit 
from the trust." Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1252 (Utah 1998). At the time of this 
pronouncement in 1998, there was apparently only one remaining founder of the 1942 trust, 
Rulon T. Jeffs, who was at that time also serving as the President of the FLDS church. 
In response to the 1998 decision of the Utah Supreme Court, Rulon Jeffs took steps to . 
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amend the trust to "ensure that his beneficial interest in the [trust] property be devoted to its 
intended charitable purpose." FLDS v. Lindberg, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Petition for Extraordinary Writ at 9. Hence, on November 3, 1998, Rulon T. Jeffs, 
Fred M. Jessop, LeRoy S. Jeffs, Warren S. Jeffs, Truman I. Barlow, Winston K. Blackmore, 
James K. Zitting, as Trustees, and Rulon T. Jeffs, President and Corporation Sole, for the FLDS 
church, executed the "Amended and Restated Declaration of Trust and the United Effort Plan." 
The purpose for amending the trust was to make sure it qualified as a charitable trust 
under Utah law. Accordingly, its beneficiary class was expanded to include not just those who 
founded the trust, but all FLDS church members who "consecrate their lives, times, talents, and 
resources to the building and establishment of the Kingdom of God on Earth under the direction 
of the President of the [FLDS] church." Amended and Restated Declaration of Trust of the 
United Effort Plan Trust, dated November 3,1998, at 3. The "Declaration of Trust" of the 1998 
Restated Trust states that it "is a religious and charitable trust" and "a spiritual (Doctrine and 
Covenants 29:34) step toward living the Holy United Order." Id. at 1. 
Prior to 1942, and continually to 1998, the Priesthood Work (the FLDS church) was 
headquartered in a community straddling the border of Utah and Arizona known originally as 
Short Creek. Today, although it still operates generally as one community, the section located in 
Arizona is known as Colorado City, Arizona and the section located in Utah is known as Hildale, 
Utah. The community presently consists of some 5,000 acres of land, comprising approximately 
700 houses, and various farms, dairies, and other businesses and operations. Virtually all of this 
property is within the UEP Trust. By some estimates, it has a value of $100,000,000.00. Eric G. 
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Andersen, Protecting Religious Liberty Through the Establishment Clause: The Case of the 
United Effort Plan Trust Litigation, 2008 UTAHL. REV. 739, 742 (2008). 
The 1998 .Amended UEP Trust is a relatively brief (4 page) document. The Trust 
specifically declares that it "exists to preserve and advance the religious doctrine and goals of the 
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, previously known as 'The 
Priesthood Work' and refers to the Holy United Order as a 'central principle of the church.'" It 
further states that "the doctrines and laws of the Priesthood and the [FLDS] Church . . . are the 
guiding tenets by which the Trustees of the United Effort Plan Trust shall act." Id. The Trust 
also declares that the trustees are to "administer the Trust consistent with its religious purpose to 
provide for Church members, according to their wants and needs, insofar as their wants are just 
(Doctrine and Covenants 82:17-21)." Id. at 3. i 
The plaintiffs claim in this lawsuit that the Trust is an important part of their religion and 
that all decisions regarding their "just wants and needs" are fundamentally religious 
i 
determinations. (Willie Jessop Aff. f 23.) They cite to the Trust itself as evidence that 
continued enjoyment of Trust participation is conditioned on living in accordance with the 
principles of the United Order as determined by those in ecclesiastical leadership. In the event i 
of termination of the Trust, the Trust provides that "the assets of the Trust Estate at that time 
shall become the property of the Corporation of the President of the Fundamentalist Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, corporation sole." Amended and Restated Declaration of 
Trust at 4. 
6 
i 
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Warren Jeffs and State Action 
In 2002, Rulon Jeffs died. His son, Warren, replaced him as prophet and president of the 
FLDS church and as president of the board of trustees of the UEP Trust. Under its new leader, 
the FLDS church began moving some of its followers to a new site near Eldorado, Texas. As the 
first decade of the 21st century progressed, the church, its president and its members became 
embroiled in many legal disputes, both civil and criminal. In one of the most publicized of these, 
Warren Jeffs was charged with aiding and abetting rape, a first-degree felony, in Utah's Fifth 
District Court in 2005. This criminal charge stemmed from Jeffs' involvement in an arranged 
marriage between two members of the FLDS church, one of whom was a 14-year-old girl at the 
time, and who has since left the church. 
In July and August of 2004, two tort lawsuits were filed against Warren Jeffs, the Trust, 
the FLDS church, and other defendants in Utah's Third District Court in Salt Lake County. The 
claims included allegations of child sexual abuse. Jeffs and the other trustees failed to defend 
these lawsuits, which exposed the Trust to possible default judgments. During this time, there is 
evidence to suggest Jeffs' decision to do nothing in defense of the lawsuits against the Trust was 
deliberate, possibly motivated by his belief that his followers should leave the Short Creek area 
and relocate to Texas. Whatever his motivation, however, it appears undisputed that he 
instructed his followers to "answer them (the state authorities) nothing and don't give them any 
testimony or witness." (Def. Wisan's Mem. Opp. at 10.) 
In May, 2005, as a result of Mr. Jeffs' and the other trustees' actions in failing to defend 
against the tort lawsuits, the Utah and Arizona Attorneys General filed a petition in Utah's Third 
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District Court seeking the removal or suspension of the trustees of the Trust. The Attorneys 
General based their decision to file the action on the belief that the trustees of the Trust, 
particularly Warren Jeffs, were violating their fiduciary duties by not appropriately responding to 
the tort lawsuits, which placed the beneficiaries of the charitable Trust at risk of being evicted 
from the Trust's homes and property. The petition was in the nature of a probate action pursuant 
to the Utah Uniform Trust Code and requested "an immediate order suspending the authority and 
power of the current trustees pending a final decision by the Court on their removal and 
appointing an interim special fiduciary for the limited purpose of preserving the assets of the 
trust," along with other relief. In the Matter of the United Effort Plan Trust, Case No. 
053900848, Utah Attorney General's Petition at 2. 
Just as with the tort lawsuits, the trustees did not respond in any fashion to the probate { 
action. Thereafter, the Third District Court granted relief. First, on June 16, 2005, Judge Deno 
Himonas entered an order suspending the trustees and appointing Mr. Bruce Wisan as a Special 
\ 
Fiduciary, as requested by the Utah Attorney General. Then, on September 2, 2005, Judge 
Denise Lindberg entered an "order on Procedure to Appoint Trustees and Expansion of Special 
Fiduciary's Authority." This order generally authorized Mr. Wisan to do what he deemed < 
prudent and reasonable to manage the Trust property, to defend against the tort lawsuits and to 
see that property and other taxes were paid. See In the Matter of the United Effort Plan Trust, 
i 
Case No. 053900848, Order on Procedure to Appoint Trustees and Expansion of Special 
Fiduciary's Authority at 2-4. 
During the next three months, various proposals were made to the state court seeking the 
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appointment of substitute trustees and reformation of the Trust. These proposals came 
exclusively from persons who had sued the Trust, including former members of the FLDS 
church. 
As these activities were taking place, and after having been criminally charged with 
aiding and abetting rape, Warren Jeffs' whereabouts were unknown. He was eventually found 
on August 28, 2006, in a Cadillac Escalade which was stopped on a Nevada highway for a traffic 
violation. He has been incarcerated on one charge or another ever since. During 2005 and 
throughout 2006, his followers, including the plaintiffs here, continued to do nothing to respond 
to either the tort lawsuits against the Trust or the probate action because that was what their 
prophet told them to do. As a result, it appears the only people the court was hearing from were 
the state Attorneys General and those who opposed the regime of Warren Jeffs. 
After considering the various reform proposals, Judge Lindberg issued a rather lengthy 
Memorandum Decision on December 13, 2005, in which she determined that because of the 
malfeasance of its trustees, the UEP Trust should be reformed. At this point, the court clearly 
had three options pursuant to the Utah Uniform Trust Code. The district judge could (1) do 
nothing, (2) allow the Trust to be terminated pursuant to its own terms, or (3) reform the Trust 
and appoint new leadership to administer the Trust. She chose the last of these, apparently in an 
effort to protect the property and its beneficiaries. 
In her Memorandum Decision, Judge Lindberg concluded that the 1998 Trust document 
is the "operative instrument" for the court to consider, and that it qualifies as a charitable trust. 
She further determined that the Trust should be modified "in a manner consistent with the 
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settlor's charitable purposes." 
The court also determined, consistent with its understanding of the United States 
Constitution, that it could not reform the Trust on the basis of religious doctrine or principles. 
The judge therefore stated that the reformation would avoid constitutional problems by applying 
"neutral principles of law" as explained in Jones v. Wolf 443 U.S. 595 (1979), and other United 
States Supreme court precedent. She stated: "courts must separate that which is primarily 
ecclesiastical from that which is primarily secular," and not enter the discussion of the former. 
In the Matter of the United Effort Plan Trust, Case No. 053900848, dated December 13, 2005 at 
Tf 35. She read the 1998 Trust as having a religious part (she called it "the Plan," which was 
essentially a reference to the United Order concept) and a secular part (which she called "the 
Trust"), and declared that the goal of the reformation process was to "create a clear division 
between the two." Id, at f 39. Finally, in her Memorandum Decision, Judge Lindberg invited 
proposals for the final reformation of the Trust. Id. at \ 56. 
On October 25, 2006, nearly a year later, the court created the Reformed Trust, replacing 
the original 4-page document, with its 17 paragraphs, with a new version of 175 paragraphs. The 
reformation significantly expanded the powers of the Special Fiduciary. Under his new 
authority, Mr. Wisan was to implement a "strategic plan to subdivide Trust property so that it 
can be conveyed to members of the beneficiary class in a religiously neutral manner in 
furtherance of the Reformed Trust's purpose to serve the 'just wants and needs' (primarily 
housing) of all persons who consecrated to the Trust." (Def. Wisan's Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Approval of Sale of Trust Property dated October 27, 2008 at 2.) 
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Under the Reformed Trust, it became the responsibility of the state appointed Special 
Fiduciary to determine the "just wants and needs" of the people who live and depend on the 
Trust property. It is up to the Special Fiduciary and the "Advisory Board" of the Reformed Trust 
to decide who is entitled to live in which homes and when they need to move. Apparently in an 
attempt at humor, the Special Fiduciary initially introduced himself to the members of the FLDS 
church as the "State-ordained Bishop." (Willie Jessop Aff. fflf 26-27.) What the members of the 
FLDS church formerly took to their church leaders regarding administration of Trust assets they 
are now supposed to take to the Special Fiduciary who is under order of the state court to decide 
such matters by "neutral principles" and may not rely on matters of faith or religion. 
After the state court's reformation of the UEP Trust in December 2006, the Special 
Fiduciary assembled a team of people, including accountants, lawyers, and other professionals to 
administer the Trust property and determine the wants and needs of the people. With dozens, if 
not hundreds, of properties to manage, and a considerable number of disputes over who was 
entitled to what, the Special Fiduciary's expenses mounted. During 2007 and into 2008, the 
former trustees, and the members of the FLDS church, including the present plaintiffs, continued 
to remain largely uninvolved in the probate action in state court. In mid-2008, however, that 
changed for what appear to be 2 reasons. First, Warren Jeffs apparently had a change of opinion 
about asserting his and his church members' legal rights in court, and second, the Special 
Fiduciary announced an intention to sell certain Trust property that held special economic, 
historical and spiritual significance to the FLDS community, including, notably, the Berry Knoll 
Farm, which, according to the plaintiffs, is "a part of the prophetic vision and divine command 
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that the Short Creek area will become a garden spot of the west, and is the location of a temple 
site as divinely revealed to church leaders." (Willie Jessop Aff. f^ 39.) 
The Special Fiduciary told the state court he needed to sell Trust property, including 
specifically the Berry Knoll Farm, to "resolve the current cash crunch problems," which referred 
to the multimillion dollar obligations owed to the Special Fiduciary's legal, accounting, and 
other functionaries. 
This request by the Special Fiduciary caused the plaintiffs to do two things. First, they 
sought to intervene in the probate action for the purpose of asserting their rights. This was 
denied by Judge Lindberg on the ground that the plaintiffs did not have standing as parties in the 
probate action. Second, they filed this federal lawsuit on October 6, 2008, seeking a declaration 
that the state actors' conduct violates the United States Constitution. 
At the outset of this federal case, the plaintiffs sought a Temporary Restraining Order 
halting the sale of the Berry Knoll Farm and all other actions of the Special Fiduciary. A hearing 
i 
on the matter was held on November 12, 2008, with all parties present and represented. After a 
lengthy hearing, it was determined that the parties were willing to mutually agree that nothing 
would be done to proceed with the property sale or to otherwise affect the Trust property until , 
the parties either reached a settlement or resumed the matter in court. Accordingly, this action 
was stayed pending further action of the parties. 
During 2009, while this action was stayed, the parties engaged in extensive settlement 
efforts with former United States District Judge Paul Cassel, but were unable to reach a final 
settlement. Thereafter, the state court issued a decision authorizing the sale of the Berry Knoll 
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Farm to the highest bidder. This caused the plaintiffs to file an action in the Utah Supreme 
Court, styled as a Petition for Extraordinary Writ, in which they sought virtually the same relief 
sought in this action: a declaration that the state district court's reformation and administration of 
the UEP Trust is a violation of the Constitution. 
The Utah Supreme Court issued its decision on August 27, 2010, finding the action 
barred by laches. At that point, the plaintiffs renewed their motion for injunctive relief before 
this court. After briefing, a hearing was held on December 3, 2010, with Rodney Parker, 
Frederick Gedicks, and Stephen Clark representing the plaintiffs and Jeffrey Shields, William 
Richards, and Jerrold Jensen representing the defendants. At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
court asked the parties to attempt to mutually agree on a preservation of the status quo pending a 
decision on the motion. They later reported to the court that they could not agree. Accordingly, 
this court entered a Temporary Restraining Order as of December 13, 2010, generally preserving 
the status quo until a decision can be rendered on the motion. Among other things, the Order 
prohibits any action on the sale of the Berry Knoll Farm and stays further action on any plans to 
subdivide the Trust property. 
DISCUSSION 
The Establishment Clause 
The First Amendment declares that "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion " U.S. CONST, amend. I. From its passage by the First Congress in 
1791, this clause, popularly known as the Establishment Clause, has been consistently 
interpreted as prohibiting the federal government from establishing a national church and, in 
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more general terms, as keeping separate the spheres of church and state. The framers of the 
Constitution sought to keep the government out of the affairs of the churches of America, and 
vice versa. After the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment following the Civil War, the United 
States Supreme Court determined that the Establishment Clause is applicable to the states. See 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). 
Everson v. Board of Education was the first major Establishment Clause case. It 
involved a New Jersey state law that provided for the parents of students who attended private 
and Catholic schools in Ewing, New Jersey to be repaid for the bus fares they paid to get their 
children to and from school. A taxpayer challenged the law as unconstitutional because it 
benefitted the Catholic Church. 
In an 18-page opinion for the 5-justice majority, Justice Hugo Black took considerable 
effort to explain the historical underpinnings of the Establishment Clause. After quoting from a 
letter Thomas Jefferson wrote to the Danbury Baptist Church, he wrote: "The First Amendment 
has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We 
could not approve the slightest breach." Id. at 18. 
After such strict wording, one may have thought the New Jersey bus fare law was 
doomed, but it was deemed not to violate the Constitution because the state involvement was so 
minimal. The Court found that "the State contributes no money to the schools. It does not 
support them. Its legislation, as applied, does no more than provide a general program to help 
parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from 
accredited schools." Id. at 19. 
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The next year in McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), the Supreme 
Court repeated its Everson Establishment Clause analysis in a case involving a program in the 
public schools of Illinois that allowed for release time for students to receive religious 
instruction. The Court, this time unanimously, found the Illinois practice in violation of the 
Establishment Clause, stating: 
This is beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported 
public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith. And it falls 
squarely under the ban of the First Amendment (made applicable to the states by the 
Fourteenth) as we interpreted it in Everson v. Board of Education. There we said: 
'Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass 
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.' 
Id. at 6. 
The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause caseload increased significantly after 
McCollum, and as those two pioneering cases illustrated, the result depended on the unique facts 
of each case. Notable Establishment Clause cases followed including: Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 
421 (1962), where the Court struck down as unconstitutional a state-written prayer required to be 
said at the beginning of the school day in the public schools in the state of New York; Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), in which a creche display was found to violate the Establishment 
Clause because of its primarily religious nature; and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), in 
which the Court found that it was constitutionally permissible for a state to provide, among other 
things, funds to nonpublic schools including those operated by religious institutions to purchase 
secular textbooks for use by their students.1 
^ther important Establishment Clause cases include: Wallace v. Jaffree, 412 U.S. 38 
(1985) (holding that mandatory moment of silence in schools for the purpose of private prayer 
violated the Establishment Clause); Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater 
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After a number of these fact-intensive inquiries, the United States Supreme Court 
announced a three-part test in what has become perhaps the most cited Supreme Court 
Establishment Clause case, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). There the Court stated 
that for state action to pass constitutional muster it must meet each of the following three 
requirements: 
(1) it must have a secular purpose, 
(2) its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, 
and 
(3) it must not foster excessive government entanglement with religion. 
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently confirmed that the "purpose and effect 
prongs" of Lemon are to be interpreted "in light of Justice O'Connor's endorsement test." 
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (striking down a creche display in a county courthouse I 
which contained the phrase Gloria in Excelsis Deo while upholding the display of a nearby 
menorah, which appeared with a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty); Lee v. Weisman, 505 
U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that offering of prayer before a voluntarily attended graduation was 
unconstitutional); Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding that a 
vote of the student body could not authorize student-led prayer prior to school events); Zelman v. \ 
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding the constitutionality of private school 
vouchers); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (holding that a Ten Commandments display 
at the Texas state capital capitol did not violate the Establishment Clause because of its secular 
purpose); McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (striking down a Ten 
Commandments display in several courthouses because it was not integrated with a secular , 
purpose); O'Connor v. Washburn University, 416 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that 
the Tenth Circuit uses Justice O'Connor's endorsement test to interpret the purpose and effect 
prongs of Lemon for Establishment Clause analysis); American Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 2010 
WL 5151630 (10th Cir. 2010) (striking down the use of memorial crosses to commemorate 
fallen highway troopers in Utah); Trunk v. City of San Diego, — F.3d —, 2011 WL 9636 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (holding that a large Latin cross located on city property on top of Mount Soledad in 
San Diego violates the Establishment Clause). 
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Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, KM., 541 F.3d 1017, 1030 (10th Cir. 2008). "Under the 
'endorsement test,' the 'government impermissibly endorses religion if its conduct has either (1) 
the purpose or (2) the effect of conveying a message that religion or a particular religious belief 
is favored or preferred."' Id. (quoting Bauchman v. West High School, 132 F.3d 542, 551 (10th 
Cir. 1997)). 
Against this established Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent, we turn to the 
question whether the states' actions in this case violate the Establishment Clause. The answer is 
an unqualified "yes." A better question would be how do they not? Virtually from its first step 
after it decided to reform the Trust, the state court was in forbidden territory. It not only had no 
authority to determine the "just wants and needs" of the members of the FLDS church, but it had 
no authority to interpret or reform the Trust at all. 
In fairness to the state district court, it did not have anyone initially presenting an 
Establishment Clause challenge, but it is still difficult with the benefit of hindsight to see how 
the court that was in one respect so mindful of using "neutral principles" to avoid 
unconstitutional behavior could at the same time fail to recognize that in reforming the Trust as it 
did it was essentially taking over one of the central tenets of the FLDS religion. In so doing it 
violated the Establishment Clause. By reforming a religious trust and managing it without 
regard to religion, the state actors became impermissibly entangled with religion. While it is 
accurate to say the states' actions did not establish a religion, their actions certainly went a long 
way toward disestablishing one. No matter how one analyzes the states' action against the 
second and third prongs of the Lemon test, they come up lacking. The primary effect of the state 
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court's decision to rewrite the Trust and administer it as a secular instrument was to inhibit 
religion. The resulting intrusion into the everyday life of the FLDS church and its members 
fostered not only "excessive government entanglement with religion," but was a virtual takeover 
by the state. 
The court finds it interesting, and somewhat telling, that the defendants' responses to the 
plaintiffs' constitutional challenges are so tepid as to be nearly nonexistent. In extensive briefing 
in this case, the defendants cite no case that is even suggested to be remotely similar enough to 
the instant case to support their defense. This is because there isn't one. The defense amounts to 
nothing more than a repeat of why the state actors felt it was so important for them to take the 
action they took, as opposed to why it was constitutionally justified. The defendants speak at 
long length about how bad-even criminal-Warren Jeffs' behavior was, but they say little that is < 
relevant to defend their own wholesale interference with an established church. The Arizona 
Attorney General's response to the plaintiffs' constitutional arguments is less than one-half of 
one page (see Arizona Attorney General's Opp. Mem. at p.24-25) and cites no cases or other 
authority in support of its position. 
The plainness of the state court's breaching of the wall of separation between church and
 ( 
state is found in an objective reading of the 4-page 1998 UEP Trust itself. One simply cannot 
read that document and fail to see that it is a religious document. As stated earlier, this 
document consists of only 17 paragraphs. It is straightforward and uncomplicated. Because a 
correct understanding of what it says is so important to a full appreciation of its religious nature, 
representative sections are reprinted below: 
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The United Effort Plan Trust is a religious and charitable trust. It is the legal 
entity of the United effort Plan. The Trust was created by Declaration of trust dated 
November 9, 1942, and was amended April 10, 1946. 
The United Effort Plan Trust is a spiritual (Doctrine & Covenants 29:34) step 
toward living the Holy United Order. It exists to preserve and advance the religious 
doctrines and goals of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, previously known as "The Priesthood Work," or "The Work" (the "Church"). 
The United Effort Plan is under the direction of the President of the Church, who 
holds the keys of Priesthood authority (which keys have continued from Joseph 
Smith, Jr. To Brigham Young, John Taylor, John W. Woolley, Lorin c. Woolley, 
John Y. Barlow, Leroy S. Johnson, and Rulon T. Jeffs). The doctrines and laws of 
the Priesthood and the Church are found in the Book of Mormon, the Doctrine and 
Covenants, the Pearl of Great Price, the Holyl Bible, the sermons of the holders of 
the keys of Priesthood authority, and present and future revelations received through 
the holder of those keys; and are the guiding tenets by which the Trustees of the 
United Effort Plan Trust shall act. 
* * * 
Rulon T. Jeffs holds the keys of Priesthood authority and so serves as the 
President of the Church. President Jeffs is also the sole remaining original Trustee 
and subscriber of the United Effort Plan Trust, and President of the Board of Trustees 
of the United Effort Plan Trust. In those capacities he, and Fred M. Jessop, LeRoy 
S. Jeffs, Warren S. Jeffs, Truman I. Barlow, Winston K. Blackmore and James K. 
Zitting, as Trustees, hereby amend and restate the Declaration of Trust to more 
clearly set out its purposes and manner of operation. This document is a total 
restatement and amendment of the Declaration of Trust. It supersedes all previous 
documents, including all documents filed of public record in Utah and Arizona and 
with various courts. The Corporation of the President of the Fundamentalist Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, a corporation sole, hereby ratifies this 
amendment. This Amended and restated Declaration of Trust has also been 
approved by the Priesthood and sustained by the Church membership. Because the 
Trust is a charitable trust, this Amended and Restated Declaration of Trust will be 
recorded in the public record but no future affidavits of disclosure will be recorded. 
### 
Since the original conveyance substantial additional real estate has been 
added as consecrations to the Trust Estate, and parcels have been purchased, traded, 
subjected to rights-of-way, and dedicated as roads and streets. It is anticipated that 
property will continue to be added as consecrations to the Trust Estate. Property has 
19 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
y 
been conveyed as consecrations to the United Effort Plan Trust in the name of the 
United Effort Plan; as well as in the names of Trustees or of a single Trustee such as 
in the name of Fred M. Jessop, as Trustee. All properties now included or hereafter 
added to the Trust Estate are consecrated and sacred lands, dedicated to the United 
Effort Plan's religious purpose. 
The United Effort Plan is the effort and striving on the part of Church 
members toward the Holy United Order. This central principle of the church 
requires the gathering together of faithful Church members on consecrated and 
sacred lands to establish as one pure people the Kingdom of God on Earth under the 
guidance of Priesthood leadership. The Board of Trustees, in their sole discretion, 
shall administer the Trust consistent with its religious pupose to provide for Church 
members according to their wants and their needs, insofar as their wants are just 
(Doctrine and Covenants, Section 82:17-21). 
A consecration is an unconditional dedication to a sacred purpose. 
Consecration of real estate to the United Effort Plan Trust is accomplished by a deed 
of conveyance. Church members also consecrate their time, talents, money, and 
materials to the Lord's storehouse, to become the property of the Church and, where 
appropriate, the United Effort Plan Trust. All consecrations made to or for the 
benefit of the United Effort Plan Trust are dedicated to the sacred purpose of the 
United Effort Plan and without any reservation or claim of right and/or ownership. 
Improvements made by persons living on United Effort Plan Trust property become 
the property of the Trust and are consecrations to the Trust. 
The privilege to participate in the united Effort Plan and live upon the lands 
and in the buildings of the United Effort Plan Trust is granted, and may be revoked, 
by the Board of Trustees. Those who seek that privilege commit themselves and 
their families to live their lives according to the principles of the United Effort Plan 
and the Church, and they and their families consent to be governed by the Priesthood 
leadership and the Board of Trustees. They must consecrate their lives, times, talents 
and resources to the building and establishment of the Kingdom of God on Earth 
under the direction of the President of the Church and his appointed officers. All 
participants living on United Effort Plan Trust property must act in the spirit of 
charity (Moroni 7:6-10, 45-48). They must live in the true spirit of brotherhood 
(Matthew 22:36-40) and there shall be no disputations among them (3 Nephi 18:34). 
The Trust is most firmly committed to these goals. People who are granted the 
privilege to live on United Effort Plan Trust property acknowledge by their presence 
upon the land their acceptance of the terms of this Trust. 
Participation in the United Effort Plan and use of property owned by the 
United Effort Plan Trust is not and does not become a right or claim of anyone who 
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may benefit in any way from the Trust. Use of Trust property must be within rules 
and standards set by the Board of Trustees. The Board of Trustees may require 
individuals and their families to relocate to different locations on United Effort Plan 
Trust property or to share a location with others. Participants who, in the opinion of 
the Presidency of the Church, do not honor their commitments to live their lives 
according to the principles of the United Effort Plan and the Church shall remove 
themselves from the Trust property and, if they do not, the Board of Trustees may 
in its discretion cause their removal. At such time as they reform their lives and the 
lives of their family members and are again approved by the Priesthood and the 
Board of Trustees they may again be permitted to participate in the United Effort 
Plan. The Board of Trustees shall have no obligation whatsoever to return all or any 
part of consecrated property back to a consecrator or to his or her descendants. 
To carry out its religious mission and charitable purpose, the Trust shall be 
administered by a Board of Trustees consisting of not less than three nor more than 
nine Trustees appointed in writing by the President of the Church. Trustees shall 
serve at the pleasure of the President of the Church and may be removed or replaced 
at any time by the President. Dismissal of a Trustee shall be by a written notice, 
effective on the date the notice is executed. A trustee m ay resign by written notice 
to the President of the Church. Each successor Trustee shall have the same powers 
and authority, and shall be subject to the same duties and restrictions, as predecessor 
Trustees. 
* * * 
This Declaration of Trust may be amended at any time and from time to time 
by the President of the Church and a majority of the Trustees. The Trust is intended 
to be a charitable trust of perpetual duration; however, in the event of termination of 
this Trust, whether by the board of Trustees or by reason of law, the assets of the 
Trust Estate at that time shall become the property of the Corporation of the 
President of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 
corporation sole. 
Amended and Restated Declaration of Trust at 1-4. 
As noted above, the state court found this 1998 Trust to be the "governing instrument" 
and that it constitutes a charitable trust. The state court judge then decided that in order to 
"protect and maintain the charitable nature of the trust," that the Trust needed to be reformed 
employing "neutral principles of law." The problem with this approach at the outset is that it 
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involved the state court in the business of interpreting (that is, defining) a self-styled "religious" 
and "spiritual" Trust that by its own language "exists to preserve and advance the religious 
doctrines and goals of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints " Id. 
at 1. This is forbidden by the Establishment Clause. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 16. To put it 
plainly, once the state court read the 1998 Trust it should have recognized that it is a religious 
document and done nothing further with it. Pursuant to the Establishment Clause, the court had 
no business doing anything at all with or to the 1998 Trust once it was recognized as a religious 
trust that is based on a fundamental tenet of the FLDS church. After reading it, the only thing 
the court could do with this Trust was to leave it alone. Due to the malfeasance of the trustees in 
not responding to the tort lawsuits, the court could revoke the Trust (as would be the case with 
any failed charitable trust, religious or otherwise) and allow the trust property to be distributed in 
accordance with the Trust's own terms, but the court was barred by the First Amendment from 
doing anything more than that. 
Nevertheless, the state court judge decided she could reform the document by seperating 
the religious parts of the text from the secular parts of the text, an act which, even if it wasn't 
forbidden, this court finds to be impossible. One may as well attempt to make Deuteronomy 
secular, or the Koran, or to eliminate football from the Super Bowl. The religious nature of the 
Trust is plain and obvious. To the extent there are aspects of the Trust that can be called secular, 
they are unquestionably inextricably intertwined with the religious. 
Next, after the court's impermissible behavior in construing and reforming the Trust, the 
court continued its unconstitutional march into the realm of the religious by appointing a non-
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religious state functionary to manage and administer the newly interpreted trust in a new secular 
way which forbids any religious reasons from informing his decisions. This activity goes far 
beyond a government sponsored prayer (Engel), a state textbook program for religious-school 
students (Wolmari), a graduation prayer at a public school (Lee), a stand-alone creche on 
government property (Lynch), or any other example of impermissible state behavior found in the 
growing body of Establishment Clause precedents. 
Looking at this situation through the eyes of the plaintiffs, it is not difficult to see what 
happened and its obvious enormous impact on the religious lives of the members of the FLDS 
church. Before the court's reformation of the 1998 UEP Trust, before the appointment of the 
Special Fiduciary, the plaintiffs, 5,000 or so in number, resided in homes belonging to the Trust, 
worked in fields and factories and dairies belonging to the Trust, and had many of their personal 
wants and needs involving food and shelter provided by the Trust; and all decisions about these 
matters were made by their FLDS church leaders. And all of these decisions were based, 
consistent with the Trust's language, on a large number of factors including whether they had 
"commit[ted] themselves and their families to live" the United Order and the extent to which 
they "act[ed] in the spirit of charity," "live[d] in the true spirit of brotherhood," and had "no 
disputations among them." Amended and Restated Declaration of Trust at 3. In other words, 
factors based on their religion and their faithfulness to it. 
For bad or good, anyone who had agreed to the plan was subject to these same rules and 
was bound to accept the decisions made by his or her religious leaders. There is no question 
plaintiffs' religious faithfulness played a significant role in the administration of the Trust. 
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The day the Special Fiduciary began his job, however, that was gone, replaced by a 
secular authority who decided the same matters of Trust property distribution not only based on 
an entirely new regime of secular criteria, but also on the express condition that religious reasons 
could not be controlling. One's faithfulness to the principles of the church was replaced by 
purely secular criteria such as caloric intake needs and whether more heat was needed for 
warmth in the winter. 
The state court's reliance on Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979), is wholly misplaced. 
Jones followed Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1968), which recognized that neutral principles of law may 
be employed by courts to resolve church property disputes without running afoul of the 
Establishment Clause if such principles are the type "for use in all property disputes" and do not 
in any way require the court to interpret ecclesiastical questions. Id. at 449. 
Indeed, as plaintiffs point out, in Jones the Supreme Court actually gave guidance to 
religious organizations about how to structure their property documents to cover otherwise non-
justiciable contingencies: 
Through appropriate reversionary clauses and trust provisions, religious societies can 
specify what is to happen to church property in the event of a particular contingency 
. . . . In this manner, a religious organization can ensure that a dispute over the 
ownership of church property will be resolved in accord with the desires of its 
members. 
Jones, 443 U.S. at 603. 
The 1998 Trust was structured in just this fashion by providing that in the event the Trust 
failed, the Trust property would revert to the FLDS church. This would avoid the possibility of a 
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non-justiciable contingency. But, rather than allow such a result, the state actors sought and 
obtained a reformation of the Trust, which required disregarding all religious aspects of the Trust 
and inventing what they called a secular instrument. Nothing about that process employed the 
neutral principles referred to in Jones v. Wolf. First of all, the case before the state court did not 
present a property dispute at all; it was occasioned by an alleged breach of fiduciary duty by its 
trustees, not because of any property dispute over the property itself. Furthermore, even if the 
case involved that type of internal church property dispute and neutral principles were 
applicable, the practice did not give the state court the authority to revise or alter religious 
church documents. Yet that is precisely what the state court did. 
No matter how much the state court attempts to label its actions as applying neutral 
principles and thereby avoid constitutional problems, what it did was an impermissible rewriting 
of the Trust document, where the religious and secular are inextricably intertwined. There was 
no proper use of the so-called "neutral principles." 
In sum, from the unique facts of this case and consistent with the Establishment Clause 
and its interpretation by the United States Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, the state actors had no authority to act as they did. Under the circumstances, given the 
trustees' failure to defend the trust against the tort lawsuits and their failure to defend against the 
claims of malfeasance against them in the probate court, the state court could have allowed the 
Trust to be revoked, but they had no authority, consistent with the United States Constitution, to 
redefine the Trust, reform the Trust, or administer the Trust. Such state action constitutes 
excessive involvement with religion in violation of the First Amendment. Accordingly, the 
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plaintiffs have established that they are substantially likely to succeed on their Establishment 
Clause claims for purposes of the requested preliminary injunction. 
Free Exercise Clause 
In addition to declaring that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion/' the First Amendment forbids Congress from "prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Free Exercise Clause is applicable to the states. 
Cantwellv. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304 (1940). 
The plaintiffs claim the defendants' actions violate their free exercise rights as well as the 
Establishment Clause. This aspect of their case has not been the plaintiffs' primary focus either 
in the written briefs or during oral argument. For purposes of the present motion for preliminary 
injunctive relief, the plaintiffs' emphasis has in the main rested on their claim that the 
Establishment Clause's structural bar has been violated. 
The history of the Free Exercise Clause differs significantly from the Establishment 
Clause. The most recent seismic shift in Free Exercise jurisprudence occurred in 1990 with 
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), in which 
the United States Supreme Court held that state laws of general application may be applied to 
churches and their members even if the consequences of such application interferes to some 
extent with a persons's exercise of religion. The Smith case dealt with the state of Oregon's law 
against the use of peyote. Several members of the Native American Church claimed that peyote 
use was a necessary part of their religious ceremonies and that enforcement of the peyote law 
against them would prevent their freedom to folly practice their religion. The Court disagreed 
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and announced the holding stated above. 
In accordance with Smith, in the instant case it appears that the state Attorneys Generals' 
petitions to the Third District Court alleging malfeasance on the part of the UEP Trust's trustees 
was a proper application of a Utah law. The trustees had chosen not to respond to two tort 
lawsuits which put the Trust property in jeopardy. But that state action was not directed at the 
plaintiffs. Quite to the contrary, the state action was designed to protect the Trust property for 
the benefit of its beneficiaries, which included the plaintiffs. 
The state action that did affect the plaintiffs was the decision to reform the Trust and turn 
over management of the Trust property to the state's Special Fiduciary. As explained above, this 
change in management completely altered the former way of dealing with the property, stripping 
away any and all matters of religion and faith, which had previously been an important and 
essential aspect of the property management system. The court recognizes there are differences 
between the two religion clauses and there may be defenses available to the state actors in 
relation to the plaintiffs' Free Exercise claims that are not available with respect to the 
Establishment Clause claims. Because the Free Exercise clause has not yet received the detailed 
attention of the parties, the court will at this point find only that under the present state of the 
record the plaintiffs' Free Exercise claims appear substantially likely to succeed, and therefore 
serve as additional support for preliminary injunctive relief to the plaintiffs. On the present state 
of the record it is difficult for this court to see how the states' action is not as violative of the 
plaintiffs' Free Exercise rights as it is of the Establishment Clause. Simply put, the plaintiffs' 
freedom to practice an important tenet of their religion (i.e. the sharing of their property on 
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religious grounds under the direction of their religious leaders) was not only eliminated but was 
replaced by a state-run secular program. If desired, however, the parties will be afforded an 
opportunity to further develop the Free Exercise issues pending a final resolution of this case. 
Jurisdictional and Preclusive Defenses 
The defendants' primary defense is that this federal court either lacks jurisdiction or is 
precluded from exercising its jurisdiction because of any or all of a wide-ranging variety of legal 
doctrines that include (1) waiver, (2) res judicata, (3) the Full Faith and Credit Clause, (4) laches, 
(5) unclean hands, (6) in custodia legis, (7) the Barton-Porter doctrine, (8) Younger abstention, 
(9) absolute immunity, (10) qualified immunity, (11) standing and (12) the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine. The court finds each of these to be either entirely inapplicable to the present case or 
sufficiently lacking as a defense to provide merit for defendants' position and to prevent this 
court from granting the plaintiffs' requested injunctive relief. 
Most importantly, the majority of these doctrines are inapplicable because they depend 
upon an underlying activity by the state where the state had jurisdiction and the authority to act. 
As explained above, the plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim is simply that the state court had 
no authority to reform the 1998 Trust and thereafter take over its management. This court 
agrees. The Constitution does not allow the state court of Utah or any other state into the realm 
of religion. Once that boundary is crossed, the court is in forbidden territory and must leave. 
Viewed in this way it is obvious the various preclusive doctrines mentioned above are not 
applicable here. Waiver is not at issue because the structural limitation set by the Establishment 
Clause cannot be waived. Such structural limitations cannot be waived by the government or 
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private litigants. See e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1985) (re: legislative veto); Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
The In Custodia Legis, Barton-Porter, and Rooker-Feldman doctrines are inapplicable 
because each presupposes that the state court in a civil lawsuit has jurisdiction and authority over 
the matter at issue, including trusts (in custodia legis), the behavior of a fiduciary (Barton-
Porter), or some other aspect of state court litigation (Rooker-Feldman). As explained above, 
due to its religious character, the state had no authority over the Trust, other than to allow it to be 
terminated. Furthermore, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable here because the 
plaintiffs were not parties to the state proceedings and because this action was commenced prior 
to the resolution of the state cases. 
Younger abstention does not pertain to this case because the state court action in question 
not only was without authority but also because it could hardly be said that the state courts of 
Utah have an important state interest in enforcing their orders and judgments that are in violation 
of the United States Constitution. Younger abstention is not applicable to a federal court 
injunction suit involving allegations of state court proceedings in violation of the Bill of Rights. 
Walckv. Edmondson, All F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2007). 
With the exception of the state court judge's immunity, the immunity doctrines presented 
by the defendants have no relevance at this stage of the case where only declaratory and 
injunctive relief are sought. Under Ex Parte Young, all of the defendants are subject to such 
prospective relief. 
As for standing, the plaintiffs have the right to bring and prosecute this action pursuant to 
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Article III of the United States Constitution and, more specifically, Rule 17(b)(3)(A) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs clearly have presented facts sufficient to present 
a justifiable controversy that directly affects them in the conduct of their daily lives. 
Laches and Res Judicata 
With regard to laches and res judicata, the defendants claim the recent opinion of the 
Utah Supreme Court which dismissed plaintiffs' case on the ground of laches bars this court 
from further action. As an alternative, they claim that even if this court is not barred from 
addressing plaintiffs' case by the doctrine of res judicata, this court should nonetheless dismiss 
the case on the basis of its own independent finding of laches. 
The court will first address whether it finds, independently, whether this action should be 
dismissed on the basis of laches. Laches is an equitable doctrine that essentially focuses on a 
party's untimeliness in bringing a claim and any injury that the delay caused to the other side. 
Angelos v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983). By its very nature, the inquiry 
is fact intensive and depends on the unique circumstance of each case. The doctrine is invoked 
relatively seldomly, primarily because of the existence of codified statutes of limitation, statutes 
of repose, and the like, all of which also deal in large part with the issues of timeliness and 
prejudice. In the end, basic fairness is the goal. If too many plans, decisions, contracts, 
adjustments, and changes have been reasonably made on a party's failure to challenge a certain 
action, at some point in time it is only fair and equitable to disallow the claim. 
Although the doctrine focuses on lack of diligence, and the prejudice it causes, it is 
apparent that the nature and quality of the alleged violation of law also play a part in the laches 
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analysis. The gravity of the offense, and the extent to which it was obvious or should have been 
obvious, to the alleged wrongdoer, are also considerations. As a practical matter a lesser slight 
may be dismissed more easily on laches than a greater one even if the delay and prejudice to 
others are the same in both cases. This is only right because the inquiry is one in equity, seeking 
to balance the various consequences felt by the affected parties. As the Utah Supreme Court 
stated in FLDS v. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, f 28, 238 P.3d 1054: "In determining whether to apply 
the doctrine of laches, we consider the relative harm caused by the petitioner's delay, the relative 
harm to the petitioner, and whether or not the respondent acted in good faith." 
In the instant case, when these three factors are folly considered, there is on the present 
state of the record no basis for a finding of laches, especially with respect to the state's 
continuing administration of the Trust. As for the first consideration, the length of the delay, the 
plaintiffs' first filing asserting their constitutional claims was in October, 2008 before this court. 
That was shortly after the plaintiffs had been denied standing to intervene in the state probate 
action, approximately four years after the Utah Attorney General petitioned the state court and 
three years after the district court reformed the Trust. All of the reasons for the plaintiffs' delay 
until 2008 to assert their constitutional rights are not known but some of them have been asserted 
as part of the record in this case. They include: (1) after Warren Jeffs declared in 2004 "to 
answer them nothing," the members of his church (the plaintiffs here) took no legal action in 
response to the Attorney General's petition; (2) a belief at some point in that earlier period that 
the FLDS members, again following their prophet, might be abandoning their homes and 
property in Southern Utah and relocating to Texas or some other location; (3) a general lack of 
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communication from the FLDS church leaders among themselves and their followers, and a good 
deal of confusion about how to deal with the unfolding situation, which included the fact that 
their prophet was facing serious criminal charges in Utah state court and that he and the Trust 
had been sued in two tort lawsuits in Utah state courts; (4) a belief based on the first two orders 
granted by the Utah court that the Special Fiduciary had relatively limited authority that focused 
primarily on seeing that taxes were paid and that the tort lawsuits were properly defended; and 
(5) the fact that the plaintiffs themselves were not parties in the proceedings and therefor under 
no obligation to do anything. 
During the first three years after the state case was commenced, then, on the current state 
of the record, it appears the plaintiffs' failure to seek legal redress was based on following the 
counsel of their religious leaders and on the belief, or hope, that the actions of the state would < 
not be sufficiently violative of their rights as to necessitate legal action in the courts. During this 
time it is also significant to recognize that the plaintiffs did not leave their homes or property. 
i 
They did not relocate to Texas. They stayed on the Trust property in Hildale and Colorado City, 
while they watched the actions of the Special Fiduciary become a reality in their everyday lives. 
When this case was filed in 2008, the circumstances had changed significantly for at least
 { 
two interrelated reasons: (1) Warren Jeffs changed his position and apparently instructed his 
followers to get legally involved and (2) the Special Fiduciary had taken steps in administering 
the Trust to do things that the FLDS members felt could not be tolerated. These included the 
decision to sell the Berry Knoll Farm property, which many of the FLDS community felt had 
special spiritual importance, and the planned final subdivision of their homes and property. In 
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addition, there were a variety of smaller actions that if allowed to happen would cause 
irreparable harm to the FLDS members. 
Accordingly, the plaintiffs altered their course in 2008 by filing this lawsuit. Thereafter, 
this court is well aware of the details that have caused the case to proceed without any final 
action by the court on the motion for injunctive relief. The main reasons have been (1) an 
extensive effort at reaching a mediated settlement, and (2) a stay of this action while the 
plaintiffs' Petition for Extraordinary Writ was dealt with by the Utah Supreme Court. 
These circumstances do not amount to the type of inexcusable delay that supports the 
dismissal of plaintiffs' claims of serious constitutional violations on the basis of laches. This is 
particularly the case with respect to the state's continuation of its administration of the Trust. 
While it is true the plaintiffs could have acted sooner, their reasons and actions under all the 
circumstances have not been sufficiently unreasonable to warrant a finding of laches. 
Turning to the injury caused to the state actors and others by the plaintiffs' waiting until 
2008 to file this case, the injury, if any, is also not sufficient to serve as a basis for applying 
laches, even if the plaintiffs failed to bring their case with appropriate diligence. The injury 
caused by the plaintiffs' delay in bringing their claims falls into three categories: (1) the Special 
Fiduciary's own unpaid bills; (2) the settlements that were reached in the two tort lawsuits; and 
(3) other (mostly unidentified) decisions made and positions taken based on the Special 
Fiduciary's actions. None of these equal the kind of obligations, expectations, and dependencies 
that warrant the extraordinary remedy of laches, a remedy which would place the payment of the 
Special Fiduciary's accountants and lawyers (from money earned from the sale of plaintiffs' own 
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property) ahead of the plaintiffs' rights to receive a fair hearing on their constitutional claims. 
The tort lawsuit settlements certainly can be dealt with by the same legal system that one 
would expect to be able to allow these plaintiffs to somewhere obtain a ruling on the merits of 
their constitutional claims. 
If the plaintiffs had abandoned their property and moved to Texas, or if they had waited a 
considerably longer period of time before seeking redress of their constitutional rights, or even if 
the damages and injury to the state and third parties was irreparable or more extensive, laches 
may be an appropriate remedy, but on the current state of the record the case for laches is not 
made. This is especially true given this court's view, as expressed above, that the defendants' 
actions were, and continue to be, in clear violation of the Establishment Clause and most likely 
in violation of the Free Exercise rights of the plaintiffs. On the present state of the record, it 
would be inequitable in the extreme to dismiss this case in its entirety on the basis of laches and 
thereby allow these serious constitutional violations to multiply and get worse. 
This court is aware of no case where laches has been found under circumstances similar 
to the instant case. This includes the critical fact that the unconstitutional violation is an 
everyday ongoing reality. Every passing day, the thousands of FLDS members who brought this 
case are experiencing the actions and decisions of a state appointed fiduciary regarding the 
property in which they live. The 1998 Trust may have been reformed three years ago but its 
illegal administration by the state is happening with every passing day. To apply laches in this 
situation would be to place the violation of the First Amendment behind the fees and expenses of 
the very state actors, and those of the (mostly) former, and now disaffected, members of the 
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FLDS church who have encouraged the state actors to take over the Trust. If the defendants are 
in territory where they are constitutionally not permitted to be, the law should require their 
eviction, not sanction their continued presence just so they can be paid for the invasion. 
Res Judicata 
Regarding res judicata, the defendants claim this court is bound by the Utah Supreme 
Court's finding of laches and must dismiss the case. The plaintiffs agree that this remedy is 
required if the Utah Supreme Court's ruling is considered to be on the merits for res judicata 
purposes, but they contend it was not. Defendants, obviously, disagree. Both sides, however, 
agree that the law of the state of Utah on this point is not settled. 
Nor do the parties agree on the general state of the law in other federal or state 
jurisdictions. They both claim support in a proper application of Rule 41(b) of the Federal and 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. They both insist that the cases cited by their opponent(s) are 
misrepresented and inapposite. They both contend the cases from other jurisdictions are strongly 
in their favor, and they insist a ruling not in their favor would be a serious miscarriage of justice. 
Currently, there is no clear precedent from the Utah Supreme Court or any other Utah 
state court regarding whether laches always constitutes a "judgment on the merits" for res 
judicata purposes. Plaintiffs argue that Utah would not find laches to provide a basis for res 
judicata in the circumstances of this case because to do so would be inconsistent with Utah law 
that holds that dismissal of a claim on the basis of a statute of limitations violation is not a 
judgment on the merits. They also assert that Utah has "drawn its descriptions of Utah 
preclusion law from California," which has held that judgments on the basis of laches are not on 
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the merits for res judicata purposes. See Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978); 
Plaintiffs' Opening Mem. at 43. 
Furthermore, plaintiffs point to the Utah Supreme Court's decision in the recent FLDS 
case where the court stated "[w]e decline to reach the merits of these claims," 239 P.3d at 1066, 
as evidence that the decision was not on the merits for res judicata purposes. 
Moreover, in supplemental briefing, the plaintiffs assert that because of the unique nature 
of the action before the Utah Supreme Court—a Petition for Extraordinary Writ, which is 
discretionary in nature, as apposed to an appeal as of right—a finding of res judicata would be 
improper. And, finally the plaintiffs argue that "the overwhelming majority of courts and 
commentators hold that a laches or limitations dismissal in state court does not preclude a 
subsequent action in a federal court or a different state court." (Plaintiffs' Supp. Reply Brief 
Regarding Res Judicata Issue at 3.) 
Defendants, on the other hand, contend that the Utah Supreme Court's ruling is 
preclusive under the Full Faith and Credit statute, that it is "on the merits" for res judicata 
purposes pursuant to controlling Utah law, and they cite many policy reasons which should 
prevent this court from considering the instant case. The defendants recognize that there is no 
direct guidance from the Utah Supreme Court on this issue, but assert that Utah would be 
inclined to follow the law of Arizona in this area, citing Day v. Wiswall's Estate, 381 P.2d 217 
(Arizona 1963), in which the Arizona Supreme Court held that laches constitutes a judgment on 
the merits for res judicata purposes. 
A close inspection of the arguments of the parties and the underlying reasons supporting 
36 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the doctrines of laches and res judicata leads this court to the opinion that in the circumstances of 
this case, the Utah Supreme Court's finding of laches was not a judgment on the merits for res 
judicata purposes. Accordingly, this court is not precluded from further action in this case. 
To begin with, it is well to remember that general notions of fairness provide the basis for 
both the doctrines of res judicata and laches. They both recognize the essential fairness in the 
view that at some point litigation over a particular controversy must come to an end. The law 
recognizes that while every person is entitled to his day in court, that is, a full and fair 
opportunity to be heard, that person is not necessarily entitled to a second day, or a third. As one 
court aptly put it, "there is justice too in an end to conflict and the quiet of peace." 
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Alexander, 614 F.2d 474, 481 (5th Cir. 1980). 
Accordingly, the common law of equity developed to deny opportunities to mount additional or 
collateral attacks on legal issues which already had an opportunity to be presented for resolution 
in a court with jurisdiction. This is the essence of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel. Initially, each of these doctrines strictly required a final judgment on the merits. Over 
time, however, "the meaning of the term 'judgment on the merits' has gradually undergone 
change and has come to be applied to some judgments that do not pass entirely upon the 
substantive merits of a claim," 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 540 (2010), and pursuant to various 
statutes and court decisions, some "judgments not passing directly on the substance of the claim" 
have nevertheless operated as a bar under res judicata and collateral estoppel rationales. Id. 
The Arizona Supreme Court opinion in Day v. Wiswall's Estate, 381 P.2d 217 (Ariz. 
1963), is an example of one of these court decisions that recognized preclusive effect even when 
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the earlier proceeding was technically not decided on the merits but rather on the basis of laches. 
The California Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. City ofLoma Linda, 5 P.3d 874 (Cal. 
2000), also a case where the underlying litigation was dismissed on the basis of laches, comes to 
a different conclusion, finding that the laches ruling was not on the merits for res judicata 
purposes. Under the current state of the law, then, it is apparent there are times when laches is 
deemed to support the application of res judicata and there are also times when it is not. While 
all of the reasons for such different results are not entirely clear, and may vary from court to 
court, it appears that one common element, and one that makes the Arizona and California 
decisions consistent with each other, is whether the underlying case in which laches was found 
included a fair examination of the circumstances and merits of the suit. This principle was 
clearly an important factor in both the Arizona and California cases. 
Day, the Arizona case, involved an action brought by a plaintiff seeking a declaration that 
portions of her stepmother's estate should be held in constructive trust for her benefit. 381 P.2d 
at 218-19. The plaintiff claimed to be an heir to l/22nd of her father's California estate, and to 
one-half of her mother's California-based community property. The mother died in 1899 and the 
father in 1911. Some 50 years after the distribution of this property to her stepmother, the 
plaintiff claimed she could still trace the property. 
The plaintiff brought suits against the same parties in both Arizona and California. 
While the Arizona case was pending appeal, a judgment was rendered in the Superior Court of 
Los Angeles County, California dealing with the same property, issues, and parties as those 
brought by the plaintiff in Arizona. At the conclusion of a trial "upon the facts," the California 
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court made a finding of laches against the plaintiff, in pertinent part, as follows: 
The separate and community interests [which plaintiff seeks to reach] * * * have 
been so intermingled over the period of approximately 56 years that it would now be 
inequitable to segregate and evaluate such interest separately, and for such delay 
plaintiff is guilty of laches insofar as she seeks relief under actions * * * No. 666,006 
* * * [and] No. 714,004. 
Id. at 220. 
The plaintiff claimed that the Arizona court should not give preclusive effect to the 
California decision because it was on the basis of laches and therefore not "on the merits." In 
disagreeing with her, the Arizona Supreme Court stated, "the doctrine of laches is properly 
applied only after a consideration of the circumstances and merits of a suit," and that "[t]he 
judgment in the California suit was not one of dismissal, but, after a full hearing and 
consideration of evidence and a finding of laches as a fact, was that the plaintiff take nothing by 
reason of the actions. It was therefore a judgment on the merits." Id, at 220 (emphasis in 
original). 
The California case, Johnson v. City ofLoma Linda, stated that "a judgment denying a 
petition for writ of administrative mandate because of the defense of laches is not a judgment on 
the merits for purposes of res judicata." 5 P.3d at 884. The court explained that "[a] judgment is 
on the merits for purposes of res judicata if the substance of the case is tried and determined," 
and that under California law "[t]he defense of laches has nothing to do with the merits of the 
cause against which it is asserted The telling consideration must be that laches constitutes 
an affirmative defense which does not reach the merits of the cause" Id. (internal quotations 
and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The court concluded its opinion with the 
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following: 
The City notes that the doctrine of res judicata promotes the public policies of giving 
certainty to legal proceedings, preventing parties from being unfairly subjected to 
repetitive litigation, and preserving judicial resources. These public policies, the 
City argues, would be promoted if we were to hold that a trial court's ruling on the 
basis of laches is a judgment on the merits. What the City overlooks, however, is 
that the doctrine of res judicata also requires that the prior dispute be resolved on its 
merits. That requirement would not be satisfied if we were to adopt the City's 
argument. 
Id. at 884 (internal citations omitted). 
In the recent FLDS case, the Utah Supreme Court identifies the doctrine of laches in Utah 
as follows: 
The length of what constitutes a lack of diligence depend[s] on the circumstances of 
each case, because the propriety of refusing a claim is equally predicated upon the 
gravity of the prejudice suffered . . . and the length of [the] delay. In determining 
whether to apply the doctrine of laches, we consider the relative harm caused by the 
petitioner's delay, the relative harm to the petitioner, and whether or not the 
respondent acted in good faith. Further, reasonable delay caused by an effort to 
settle a dispute does not invoke the doctrine of laches. 
FLDS v. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, Tf 28 (internal quotations and footnotes omitted). 
Under this definition, the court recognizes an obligation to perform an assessment of the 
merits of the plaintiffs' case in addition to the factors of delay and prejudice to others. In this 
regard, the Utah Supreme Court takes the same view of the definition of laches as the Arizona 
Supreme Court, that is, laches requires the consideration of the circumstances and merits of a 
suit. In the FLDS case, however, aside from the Utah Supreme Court's bare statement that 
laches entails a consideration of "the relative harm to the petitioner," the court undertakes no 
assessment of any kind whatsoever as to whether the plaintiffs' claims of serious constitutional 
violations had any merit at all. There is no attention given to whether the state district court's 
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reformation of the Trust was in violation of the First Amendment or whether the day-to-day 
administration and management of the Trust property constituted the ongoing serious 
constitutional violations on which the plaintiffs' case was based. Attention was devoted solely 
to discussing the delay and the alleged prejudice caused by the delay. Under these 
circumstances, the "merits" of plaintiffs' case were not considered. The "relative harm to the 
petitioner" (the plaintiffs) was not even mentioned. As a result, the plaintiffs have not yet had a 
forum in which their claims of serious constitutional violations have been entertained or 
addressed sufficiently to earn a finding that they were on the merits. 
In the final analysis, it appears from the case law, and in particular the cases from 
Arizona and California cited by the parties, that laches is entitled to preclusive effect in some 
cases, namely where there is some appropriate attention paid to the merits, and not in others. In 
this regard Utah law is in accordance with both the Arizona and California decisions. The Utah 
Supreme Court announced in FLDS a definition of laches that is the same as the Arizona high 
court. (Compare Utah's "In determining laches . . . we consider the relative harm caused by the 
petitioner's delay, the relative harm to the petitioner, and whether or not the respondent acted in 
good faith," with Arizona's "The doctrine of laches is properly applied only after a consideration 
of the circumstances and merits of a suit."). Accordingly, it would be expected that the Utah 
court would take a similar approach to finding laches as having preclusive effect only when, as 
in the Day case, there was a "full hearing and consideration of evidence" in the underlying 
action. If there is no such consideration of the merits, laches would not have preclusive effect.2 
2The defendants' brief supports this court's view that the merits of the claim must receive 
some consideration by a court before a laches finding will have preclusive effect. The Arizona 
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That is unquestionably what happened in FLDS. Therefore, consistent with the Day case, there 
is no res judicata effect from Utah's decision in FLDS. 
On the other hand, Utah law is also consistent with California's law, announced in the 
Johnson case, if a finding of laches is based only on a consideration of (1) delay by the plaintiff 
and (2) prejudice to the defendant (and third parties), and does not consider the merits of the 
plaintiffs suit. If that is the definition of laches, or if that is the way the doctrine is applied, then 
the result is a finding of no preclusive res judicata effect, as was the California court's holding in 
Johnson. Any reading of the FLDS case shows that the Utah Supreme Court focused solely on 
delay and prejudice (to the defendants) and nothing more. 
Furthermore, the court finds merit in the plaintiffs' argument that the discretionary nature 
of the relief available under the Petition for Extraordinary Writ makes a finding of res judicata 
inappropriate here. See Plaintiffs' Supp. Brief Regarding Res Judicata Issue at pp.4-9. In State 
v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, 127 P.3d 682, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that a party seeking 
relief under such a Petition "has no right to receive a remedy that corrects a lower court's 
mishandling of a particular case. Rather, whether relief is ultimately granted is left to the sound 
discretion of the court hearing the petition." Id. at \ 23. 
The Barrett court compared the decision whether to grant relief pursuant to a petition for 
extraordinary writ to a decision whether to grant a petition for a writ of certiorari. "The exercise 
Attorney General explains to the court on page 20 of his brief that "A statute of limitations bar 
looks only to the timing of the filing of the earlier action, whereas laches requires inquiry into 
the merits of the claim." He also refers the court to the Utah Supreme Court's definition of 
laches as requiring consideration of "the relative harm to the petitioner," (page 15 and again on 
page 20), to emphasize why this court should give res judicata effect to the Utah Supreme 
Court's opinion in the instant case. 
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of the court's discretion when deciding whether to grant rule 65B(d) extraordinary relief is akin 
to this court's exercise of its certiorari review powers. Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure states that '[r]eview by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial 
discretion and will be granted only for special and important reasons.'" Id. at % 24 (quoting Utah 
R. App. P. 46(a)). It was under these circumstances in which the Utah Supreme Court decided in 
its sole discretion not to grant the Writ in the FLDS petition. In doing so, the court specifically 
stated that "we decline to reach the merits of these claims." FLDS, 2010 UT 51, f 43. In this 
regard, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 41(b), it appears the Utah Supreme Court in its dismissal 
order was signaling that the decision was not operating "as an adjudication on the merits."3 
For the above reasons and based on the other authorities cited in the plaintiffs' 
supplemental briefing, the court finds the Utah Supreme Court's decision in FLDS was not on 
the merits for the purposes of res judicata. 
Other Issues/Defenses 
As addressed above, the defendants have asserted many defenses arguing that this court 
lacks jurisdiction, or that even if this court has jurisdiction, it should not exercise it. And, as 
stated, the defendants also address, albeit sparingly and unconvincingly, the substance of the 
plaintiffs' constitutional claims. But, in addition to these assertions in defense of their actions, 
the defendants also devote large amounts of their briefs, and attention in oral argument, to 
3Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "Unless the court in its order 
for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not 
provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or 
for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication on the merits." (emphasis added). 
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is virtually identical to the Utah rule. 
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addressing the bad character and alleged criminal wrongdoing of Warren Jeffs. The purpose of 
these pronouncements, as best the court can make of them, is to persuade this court that it should 
find the state action constitutionally proper because to find otherwise would allow Warren Jeffs 
(and presumably his followers) to obtain the Trust property and use it to carry out wrongful and 
criminal acts. The defendants point, in particular, to Mr. Jeffs' alleged sexual abuse of minors 
through illegal arranged marriages of young girls to older men and by other means. 
The defendants assert that if the state court were to terminate the Trust, as opposed to 
reforming and managing it, and thereby allow it to be revoked according to its own terms, the 
Trust property would revert to Warren Jeffs, as president and corporation sole of the FLDS 
church. This result, they claim, cannot be allowed to happen because Jeffs would simply 
continue to use the Trust property for nefarious purposes. They point out that he and the Trust 
were sued in the tort lawsuits on claims of illegal sexual abuse of minors, and that he was 
prosecuted criminally for such activity in Utah and is currently facing similar charges in Texas. 
They also cite instances where Mr. Jeffs has made statements that show he is manipulating the 
Trust property to assist him in his illegal behavior. 
The tort lawsuit claimants have sought to intervene in this case with similar rhetoric. 
They refer to Mr. Jeffs' criminal acts as "the elephant in the room" and argue that the Special 
Fiduciary must be allowed to continue his work in order to restrict Mr. Jeffs' ability to utilize the 
Trust and its property in aid of his criminal abuses against minors and other wrongful behavior. 
All of these accusations and pronouncements are not lost on the court. But they lack 
relevance to the question whether the state actors violated the constitutionally established 
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boundaries between church and state by their virtual remake and takeover of the 1998 Trust. 
The fact of the matter is that the state court based its decision to reform the Trust, and turn its 
administration over to the Special Fiduciary, on the malfeasance of Warren Jeffs and the other 
trustees in failing to defend the tort lawsuits and thereby subject the Trust property to possible 
default judgments. Although the defendants asserted in oral argument, and suggest in their 
briefs, that part of the reason for reforming the Trust was because of a legal determination by the 
state court that it was being used to facilitate illegal activity, there is no support for that 
assertion. 
While it is true the state court judge in reforming the Trust recognized that the FLDS 
church practiced polygamy, which is illegal, and that the Special Fiduciary would not in any 
manner be allowed to make Trust administration decisions on the basis of polygamist practices, 
the state judge nowhere based her decision to reform or administer the Trust on a finding that it 
was being used to commit or support criminal activity. The state-judge's Memorandum 
Decision states: 
The reasons for reformation are multiple. Earlier in these proceedings the Court 
determined that the suspended trustees had "committed [] serious breach[es] of 
trust," and demonstrated "unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent failure . . . to 
administer the trust effectively" on behalf of the beneficiaries of the Trust. 
Specifically, the suspended trustees and, in particular, Warren Jeffs in his capacity 
as FLDS President and President of the Board of Trustees, violated various duties 
including the duties of loyalty and 'prudent administration' of the Trust. To be 
sure, the Restatement granted the suspended trustees great discretion in managing 
the Trust. Nevertheless, the Code provides that even when the controlling trust 
instrument uses such terms as "'absolute,' 'sole,' or 'uncontrolled' [discretion,] 
the trustee shall exercise discretionary power in good faith in accordance with the 
terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries." 
While certain specific claims against the suspended trustees may be in 
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dispute, there is no question that the suspended trustees failed to defend the Trust 
against various lawsuits to which the Trust is a party. By failing to defend the 
Trust, the suspended trustees violated the Utah Code, and allowed the Trust to be 
exposed to entry of default judgments against it. Entry of judgment in those cases 
would permit prevailing parties to seize Trust assets in satisfaction of the 
judgment. Additionally, the suspended trustees knowingly and willfully failed to 
comply with two Court orders: First, they failed to provide an accounting of Trust 
assets. Second, they failed to assist the Special Fiduciary by collecting and 
providing information about how the Trust has been administered. 
. . . [I]n addition to the problems that have resulted from the trustees' 
administrative defaults, the Court's review of the Restatement has led it to 
conclude that various dispositive (i.e., substantive) provisions of that instrument 
are fundamentally flawed and unworkable. Accordingly, the Court-with the help 
of interested parties-will need to address both types of issues as part of the 
Trust's reformation. 
In the Matter of the United Effort Plan Trust, Case No. 053900848, at Iflf 21 -23. 
If there is a case to be made by the states that the property within the FLDS Trust is being 
managed and distributed to facilitate sex crimes against minors, or to facilitate polygamy, or to 
discriminate against young males within the Church, then the state may wish to make such a case 
in the appropriate place and consistent with due process, and seek the appropriate remedies, 
which may include forfeiture and confiscation of the Trust property by the state, but there is no 
support in the record before the court that such a case was ever made in either Utah or Arizona. 
Furthermore, even if such a proceeding had been held, and a decision had been reached 
that the Trust property was being used to facilitate crimes, the remedy cannot be one of remaking 
the Trust and administering it in the manner employed by the state actors in this case. Such 
action, even if it followed a finding of impropriety or criminality in the use of the Trust property, 
would still run afoul of the Establishment Clause. It would still improperly involve the state in 
taking over a religiously-based program and turning it into a secular one based on new non-
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religious rules recognized by the state. It would constitute the type of excessive entanglement 
between the state and religion not permitted under the Constitution. It is one thing for a state to 
tell a church and its members that they, just like all other residents of the state, may not smoke 
peyote, or commit child sexual abuse, or violate any other law of general application. And it is 
proper to prosecute the offenders and to seek all available legal remedies, such as property 
forfeiture. But it is quite another thing, altogether, to reorganize the religious activities of such 
churches and their members to make them conform to the states' version of appropriate secular 
behavior. 
In sum, it is the method the states chose to utilize in dealing with the Trust that this court 
finds to offend the Constitution and to support preliminary injunctive relief. There may be other 
methods that could reach many of the goals the states seem to be pursuing, but they are of course 
not at issue here. The court has listened to the many complaints about Warren Jeffs and the 
allegations of his and some of his followers' criminal and tortous misconduct, but finds that 
these allegations as a matter of law do not justify the constitutional infirmities of the state action. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary 
injunction, effective immediately, on terms identical to the present Temporary Restraining 
Order. A separate order will hereafter be entered further identifying the precise extent of the 
preliminary injunction. Defendant Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff s, defendant Arizona 
Attorney General Thomas C. Home's, and defendant Denise Posse Lindberg's motions to 
dismiss are DENIED. The tort lawsuit claimants' motion to intervene is GRANTED. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 24th day of February, 2011. 
rty^/> 
Dee Benson 
United States District Judge 
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